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ABSTRACT
The objective of this study is to determine the effect of solicitation and
independence on corporate bond ratings. Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch IBCA, are full-scale
agencies that provide both solicited and unsolicited ratings. These agencies have the
potential to provide biased ratings in both directions. Duff and Phelps provides only
solicited ratings. It is the only agency that will honor an issuer’s request not to be rated.
This fully solicited agency also has the potential to provide biased ratings. Little or no
prior research exists in this area.
MCM, an independent rating agency until it was merged into Duff and Phelps in
1991, took no fee from the issuers. The agency Egan-Jones can be considered to be a
modern-day MCM. However, there is a dearth of literature dealing with the independent
agencies. Weiss Ratings is an independent agency that rates primarily insurance firms.
This study test five hypotheses in order to determine whether solicitation and
independence may have an effect in the agencies’ ratings. The Friedman Two-Way
Analysis of Variance is the primary test utilized.

The findings reveal that Duff and

Phelps provides the highest ratings followed by Fitch IBCA. The ratings for Moody’s
and S&P are lower than both Fitch IBCA and Duff and Phelps and are not significantly
different from each other. There is no significant difference in terms of timeliness for
upgradings. The four full-scale rating agencies upgrade their ratings at the same time.
iii
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Moody’s and S&P downgrade their ratings at an earlier time than Duffand Phelps
and Fitch IBCA. Moody’s has a higher upgrade magnitude than Duff and Phelps.
The results for the independence hypotheses reveal that MCM provides lower
ratings than both Moody’s and S&P. In addition, MCM is more time in terms of
upgradings.
The results indicate that the fully solicited agency has incentives to be reluctant
to provide the true rating. This result indicates that Duffand Phelps and to a lesser degree
Fitch IBCA are hesitant to upset the issuers.

iv
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Rating agencies provide investors with information concerning the risk, quality,
and marketability of various bond issues. The agencies utilize coverage and leverage
ratios. The ratings describe the possibility of default and assess the protection creditors
have in the event o f a default. Four large full-scale agencies have historically dominated
the bond rating industry. These are Moody’s Investors’s Service, Standard & Poor’s
Corp, Fitch IBCA and Duff and Phelps. In addition, there are other agencies including
Thompson BankWatch, Egan-Jones, international agencies, and A.M. Best and Weiss
Ratings which rate health and insurance firms.
The two major bond rating agencies, Moody's Investors Service and Standard &
Poor's Corporation, have come under mounting scrutiny and criticism in recent years.
The Justice Department has investigated Moody’s Investors Service for allegedly
pressuring bond issuers to use its ratings (Harington (1997), Gasparino and Vogelstein
1996)). Airline industry financial officials have expressed frustration with Moody's and
Standard and Poor's Corporation (Jennings 1995). Elliott (1988) has pointed out that most
industrial firms believe the debt-rating agencies have failed to revise their ratings as
conditions have changed.
1
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In the past decade, both Moody's and Standard & Poor’s downgraded at least four
firms’ listings immediately before their default Some critics have accused Moody's and
S&P of responding to political pressure when rating some states and cities. Additionally,
Hawthorne (1990) has asserted that the agencies did not understand local political
nuances.
Many investors have questioned the credibility of these two rating agencies
because of these problems. Additionally, these investors have questioned these agencies’
independence from their clients. This lack of credibility has extended to the other fullscale bond rating agencies. Fitch IBCA and Duff and Phelps have also faced criticism
regarding their independence.
The solicitation issue, also, has concerned many investors. Duff and Phelps,
alone among rating agencies, has published exclusively solicited ratings. Historically,
Duff and Phelps has honored any firm’s request to not rate its bonds. Fitch IBCA has
published mostly solicited ratings. Critics have accused these two smaller full-scale
agencies of a too-close connection with the bond issuers and a resulting ratings bias.
Hence, all four full-scale bond rating agencies have some degree of dependence
upon issuers. Each of these ratings agencies receive rating fees from their clients, the
bond issuers. Thomson BankWatch, a fifth bond rating agency has rated banks only.
Egan-Jones, the sixth and newest agency, has published ratings only.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

3
Problem Statement
The issues o f solicitation and independence have created the need for empirical
research on two questions. First, does an agency’s policy toward publishing solicited
and/or unsolicited ratings affect its ratings? The literature has not addressed this
important issue. The actions of Duff and Phelps allows examination of this matter.
Second, does independence affect corporate bond ratings? A study o f the
McCarthy, Crisanti & Maffei Inc. (MCM) bond rating agency can address this issue.
MCM, which merged into Duff& Phelps in 1991, provides the only source of reference
for independence.

The fixed-income and credit rating operation, MCM has taken no

fees from its clients. The sale of its ratings has constituted MCM’s only source of
income.
Unlike its competitors, MCM has not had any communication with the
management of the issuers, and, for the most part, MCM has relied on public
information. This important difference between MCM and the four other bond rating
firms could have meant that MCM provided an issuer’s true credit rating.
Despite these relationships, no one has examined MCM. This study will test
whether MCM's ratings differed from Moody's and/or S&P’s. Also, it will test whether
MCM often changed its ratings before Moody's and S&P. Hence, the study should
provide evidence of whether independence has affected ratings and timeliness of bond
rating changes. Table 1 depicts these issues.
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Table 1: Comparison of the Five Tested Agencies
Fee from Issuer

Honor non-rating request

Moody’s

Yes

No

S&P

Yes

No

Fitch

Yes

No

MCM

No

No

DCR

Yes

Yes

In the context of bond ratings, the term “solicited” has meant that issuers
requested and paid fees for them. Solicited bond ratings have outnumbered unsolicited
ratings. Duff and Phelps has published solicited ratings only. S&P, Moody’s, Fitch
IBCA, and Thompson Bankwatch have published both solicited and unsolicited ratings.
An agency could have provided unsolicited ratings in order to gain publicity,
develop clients, and gain market share. For example, S&P has had a low financial
institution market share. Thus, they recently decided to give unsolicited ratings to 750
banks in an apparent attempt to increase business. Additionally an agency could have
provided unsolicited ratings in order to induce clients to later convert to a paid solicited
basis.
Based on discussions with personnel in the industry, the practice of publishing
both unsolicited and solicited ratings may have created the potential for malfeasance. In
this respect, the agency may have caused the suspicion that it assigned an inflated rating
in order to provide an incentive for the issuer to solicit future ratings. On the other hand,
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an unsolicited rating may have inappropriately reflected a lower rating than the true one
as punishment for an issuer that declined to pay for it.
As advantage, unsolicited ratings have no taint from management feedback
(Monro-Davis 1994). The rating service should rely solely on public information. A
disadvantage of unsolicited ratings, the agency does not have the opportunity to
interview management.
An independent firm such as MCM takes no fee from the issuer; hence, it has no
incentive to give a higher rating in order to induce conversion.

Likewise, the

independent firm has no incentive to give a lower rating. The ratings of the independent
agency do not include ratings of customers or potential customers. The new corporate
bond rating agency, Egan-Jones, functions as an independent agency, or in effect, a
modern-day MCM. In addition, Weiss Ratings, which gives safety ratings, receives no
compensation from the companies it rates.
The independent agency has no incentive to assign higher ratings in order to
satisfy issuers. Rather, the independent agency has the overall incentive to maintain a
reputation for very accurate ratings.

If investors should

lose confidence in an

independent agency’s ratings, issuers would no longer believe they could lower their
funding costs by obtaining its ratings (Cantor and Packer 1994).
Contributions of this Study
This study makes several contributions to an understanding o f bond ratings: the
first is that it reports the results of empirical research on Duff and Phelps and it explores
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ramifications of solicitation, and it addresses the independence issue.

A recent

independent survey (Cantwell 1998a) revealed the growing importance o f Duff and
Phelps as a bond rating agency. Bond issuers ranked Duff and Phelps as the best of five
rating agencies in the areas of quality service, comprehensive research, and analyst
expertise. The study explores solicitation by comparing Duff & Phelps to the other fullscale rating agencies.
In testing these hypotheses, this study has utilized data from the late 1990's; prior
research of S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch IBCA for the most part utilized much older data.
An exception, Altman (1998) in his study of expected ratings changes in S&P and
Moody’s, used data through 1996.
In the last few years, Fitch IBCA and Duff and Phelps have had dramatic
increases in bond ratings activity. This enormous increase in the rating of issuers’ bonds
of these two agencies in the U.S. and abroad is revealed in Reinebach (1998a) and
Reinebach (1998b). This present study has utilized data from 1993 through 1998, and it
will reflect that increase.
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CHAPTER 2
THEORY
This study attempts to determine the effect of both solicitation and independence
on corporate bond ratings. It addresses significant potential biases endemic to agencies
who provide strictly solicited ratings or a combination of solicited and unsolicited ratings.
The importance of the fully solicited agency has increased as Duff and Phelps was
recently rated the top global rating agency in a survey of issuers.
This study has tested the issue of independence in order to determine if these
agencies have provided true ratings. The independent status of the newest agency, EganJones, also reflects the importance of the independent agency.
This study has focused on split ratings (a split rating occurs when two or more
agencies rate the same bond issue differently). The area of split ratings has received
considerable attention in previous research. Except for Hite and Warga (1997) and
limited other research which compared Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch, most prior studies
examined only Moody’s and S&P.

7
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Reliability o f Bond Ratings
The reliability of the bond ratings has often manifested itself in terms of relative
and absolute risks of corporate bond defaults. Ratings must at a minimum provide a
reasonable rank-ordering or relative credit risks (Cantor and Packer 1994). In addition,
ratings must provide a reliable guide to absolute credit risk. Cantor and Packer showed
that Moody’s and S&P satisfactorily assessed relative credit risks; lower rated bonds
tended to default on a more frequent basis.
Altman (1989) showed a very robust pattern of increasing yields as the respective
ratings category decreased. This relationship held without exception across all years.
Cantor and Packer (1994) regarded this correlation test as a possible weak test of ratings
reliability.

However, Artus, Garrigues, and Sassenou (1993) alleged a weak or

nonexistent direct relationship between yield and the largest rating agency in the French
bond market.
Ederington, Yawitz, and Roberts (1987) found mixed evidence as to whether
bond ratings contained

information

not already captured in the market yields

(Ederington,Yawitz, and Roberts 1987). Cantor and Packer (1994) asserted that even
if ratings did not contain independent credit risk information,

both investors and

regulators might find value if ratings provided them an efficient summary of this
information. Furthermore, the authors asserted that measuring ratings performance by
contemporaneous market yields did not control for waves of either market optimism or
pessimism. One needs to accumulate ex post bond performance evidence. Clark, Foster,
and Ghani (1997) investigated the information effects o f bond rating changes.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

9
In an event study, Katz (1974) found little evidence that a rating change provided
information to the market. His study utilized an event-oriented methodology for testing
bond market efficiency. Similarly, Hettenhouse and Sattoris (1976) asserted that a rating
change for investment-grade public utility bonds provided

no information

to

shareholders.
Furthermore, Weinstein (1977) concluded that a rating change led to no
significant price change during or after the event. Weinstein also showed that the market
anticipated the change and makes adjustments from the prior six to eighteen months. In
a similar fashion, Pinches and Singleton (1978) revealed that upgradings (downgradings)
produced abnormally high (low) common stock returns before the rating change. The
authors found a lag that ensured a complete discount of any relevant information by the
change month.
However, much evidence has indicated that bond rating changes provide valuable
new information. Providing significant support for this position, Griffin and Sanvicente
(1982) utilized a paired-sample approach in order to control for additional public
information. The authors concluded that bond rating changes (both upgrades and
downgrades) provided new information to common stockholders in the eleven months
before the change. However, only downgrades conveyed new information in the event
month itself. In a similar fashion, Holthausen and Leftwich (1986), concluded that bond
rating downgrades created a negative response.
The relationship ofbond rating changes and the behavior of equity returns and risk
requires more in-depth analysis. Bi and Levy (1993) analyzed the market reaction to
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bond downgradings and found that investors reacted significantly to bond downgradings.
Investor and issuer perceptions have not historically coincided on bond ratings. For
example, Ellis (1998) showed that investors, unlike issuers, would preferred to see
ratings updated immediately in order to reflect all relevant information, even for

temporary changes. Investors regard agency ratings as more reliable indicators of
absolute credit risks.
Ratings M igration

Cantor and Packer showed that default probabilities and specific letter ratings
have clearly drifted over time. Altman (1998) assessed the rating change experience of
corporate bonds originating from two distinct initial states: from the time of issuance to
up to 10 years post-issuance and from a static-pool of issuers of a given rating,
irrespective of the bonds’ ages, to up to 10 years after pool formation.
Altman and Kao (1991) examined the question of rating change auto-correlation.
He sought to determine whether, after observing a rating change, one could expect
subsequent credit quality changes of the same issuer. They concluded that one could, and
they found that the two change in the same direction (upgrade or downgrade).
Altman (1988) examined the impact of rating change on fixed income portfolio
compositions of investors. Altman found this impact particularly restricted to fixed
income portfolio compositions with specifically defined credit
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History o f the Raring Agencies
Bond rating agencies evolved from mercantile credit agencies. These mercantile
credit agencies rated merchants’ ability to pay their financial obligations (Cantor and
Packer 1994).
In 1841, due to the financial crisis of 1837, Louis Tappan established the first
mercantile credit agency in New York. Robert Dun subsequently acquired this agency
and published its first ratings guide in 1859. In 1849, John Bradstreet formed a similar
mercantile agency and published a ratings book in 1857. The two agencies were merged
into Dun and Bradstreet in 1933. In 1962, Dun and Bradstreet bought Moody’s Investors
Service.
In 1909, the ratings business expanded to encompass securities ratings. This
expansion occurred when John Moody began to rate U.S. railroad bonds. In 1910, Moody
extended his ratings to utility and industrial bonds (Cantor and Packer 1994). In 1916,
Poor’s Publishing Company issued its first ratings. In 1922, Standard Statistics Company
issued its first ratings. In 1941, Standard Statistics and Poor’s Publishing Company
merged to form Standard and Poor’s (S&P).
The Fitch Publishing Company issued its first ratings in 1924. IBCA, a unit of
Fimalac SA in Paris, France issued its first ratings in 1978. In 1997, Fitch merged with
IBCA. The merger combined IBCA’s worldwide network of offices (that had experience
rating banks and securities outside the U.S) with Fitch’s U.S. expertise. The merger
created the third largest worldwide rating agency.
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In 1998, Fitch IBCA acquired one of Mexico’s top three rating agencies,
Clasificadora de Riesgos, S.A de C.V. (Kraus 1998). The Mexican agency rates almost
100 industrial firms.
Duff and Phelps (DCR) first began to provide ratings for a diverse spectrum of
issuers in 1982. However, DCR had researched public utility companies since 1932.
McCarthy, Crisanti, and Maffei (MCM) began in 1975; subsequently acquired by the
firm Xerox Financial Services, but MCM retained its name. MCM merged with Duff
and Phelps in 1991.
Egan-Jones, based in Wynnewood, PA, issued its first ratings in 1996. EganJones provided ratings for 850 issuers in that year, and it has since gradually expanded.
Specialized and Foreign Agencies
Thomson Bankwatch operated as a subsidiary of Keefe, Bruyette, and Woods, a
brokerage firm until

March 1989, when Thomson Corporation, a large private

international publishing conglomerate based in Toronto bought it. Thomson Bankwatch
now rates over 1000 financial institutions.
Two other rating agencies, A.M. Best and Weiss Ratings, rate life/health
insurance companies. In 1999, A.M. Best began to give debt ratings on specific bonds
of insurers. Before 1999, A.M. best rated the firm’s overall debt Weiss Ratings issues
safety ratings on over 16,000 financial institutions, including HMOs, life and health
insurers, Blue Cross Blue Shield plans, property and casualty insurers, banks and brokers.
Weiss Ratings also evaluates the Y2K preparedness of many insurers and banks, as well
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as the risk adjusted performance o f more than 5,000 mutual funds. Unlike, the full-scale
rating agencies, AM . Best and Weiss Ratings are not recognized as a Nationally
Recognized Statistical Rated Organization.
Weiss Ratings receives no compensation from the companies it rates. It derives
its revenues from sales of its products to consumers, businesses, agents, and libraries (Cox
1998). The firm refuses all insurance executives who invite the agency to hear their
business and investment plans before assigning them a grade in the Weiss Rating
publications.
Weiss Ratings bases their ratings almost exclusively on data from the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC).

The NAIC collects financial

information filed by insurers to state regulators. The firm extract 700 separate figures
from the NAIC data and incorporates these figures into a complex computer analysis Cox
1998).
It is interesting to note the fees Weiss Ratings charges for its publications.
Customers calling by phone can check a company’s Weiss rating for a fee of $15.
Individual written reports cost $25. A complete directory of listings with information of
each company costs $219.
Credit ratings overseas have increased significantly. Dale and Thomas (1991)
described the incidence of credit ratings in the financial markets of most developed
economies and numerous emerging market countries. Two major rating agencies operate
in Canada, and two major agencies operate in Japan (Cantor and Packer 1994).

The

increase in foreign demand has also led to a significant overseas expansion of the U.S.
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rating agencies. Moody’shas opened offices in Tokyo, London, Paris, Sydney, Frankfurt,
and Madrid. Moody’s rates the securities o f nearly 1,200 of approximately 4,500 nonU.S. issuers (Cantor and Packer 1994.) S&P has similar offices overseas, Mexico City,
and in Stockholm. Duff and Phelps has formed joint ventures in Mexico and in many
Latin American countries ((Reinebach 1998b). Cantor and Packer (1994) asserted that
the full-scale U.S. agencies have a competitive advantage over their foreign counterparts
in terms of providing objective, credible corporate bond ratings.
Of the non-U.S. countries, England has the highest percentage o f its large
companies rated by the U.S. agencies (Ball 1994) and Japan has the second highest
percentage.

In contrast, only a small percentage of French firms have a long-term

Euromarket debt rated by Moody’s. Among Italian firms, only Fiat has a U.S. agency
rating its debt issues.
Rating Other Debt Instruments
The four full-scale agencies rate not only long-term bonds issued by U.S. firms
but also a broad spectrum of other debt instruments. These include: municipal bonds,
asset-backed securities,preferred stocks, medium-term note programs, shelfregistrations,
private placements, commercial paper programs, and bank certificates of deposit (Cantor
and Packer 1994).
In addition, ratings have been recently applied to other types of risks. In 1998 and
1999, Egan-Jones rated the price volatility of mutual funds. Weiss Ratings is expected
to provide customer service ratings, particularly in the health-care arena (Cox 1998).
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Fitch IBCA rates an increasing number of non-acute care bonds. These are bonds from
assisted living centers and nursing homes (Hill 1997).
Rating agencies recently began applying rating classifications to the performance
risk of mortgage-backed securities (Goldstein 1996). Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, Fitch
IBCA, and Duff and Phelps have utilized different methods to assign rating categories
to multiclass mortgage-backed securities(MBS).
Moody’s has defined its MBS ratings so that two identically-rated MBS securities
will have the same expected return, even though one of the securities may have a greater
default likelihood than the other. S&P and Fitch IBCA have defined their ratings so
that two identically (S&P- or Fitch-) rated MBS securities will both have the same
likelihood of default, even though one may have a higher expected rate of return than the
other. Duff and Phelps has defined its ratings so that any two identically rated MBS will
not necessarily have the same expected return or the same likelihood o f default, but the
formula takes these measures into account (Goldstein 1996). Hence, rating agency
classifications have gained importance in the structuring and pricing of mortgage-based
securities.
Reflecting the importance of these ratings, several mutual funds and pension funds
have placed limits on the portfolio amount that they will invest in non-investment-grade
securities. Some investors and issuers specifically require ratings in bond covenants.
Similarly, investors and issuers often ask for guidance from the rating agencies on the
structuring of their financial transactions.
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The Genesis of Charging Issuers
Rating agencies initially provided free public ratings of an issuer. In those times,
the rating agencies financed their operations solely through the sale of publications and
related materials. However, users could easily copy these ratings. The publications did
not yield sufficient returns in order to justify intensive coverage (Cantor and Packer
1994).
The demand on rating agencies for faster and more comprehensive service steadily
increased. Hence, the agencies began to charge issuers for ratings. Cantor and Packer
(1994) noted that the agencies utilized these revenues in order to compete with private
sector analysts at other financial institutions.
The default of Penn Central Railroad on $82 million of commercial paper in 1970
played a key role in the transition to charging issuers. With little regard for credit quality,
the commercial paper market grew significantly in the 1960's (Cantor and Packer 1994).
Investors regarded any firm with a household name as an acceptable credit risk during this
time period. When Penn Central defaulted, investors became skeptical of the financial
condition of many firms. Those investors refused to roll over their commercial paper
during the 1970s. Those firms soon faced a liquidity crisis, and many defaulted.
In order to reassure nervous investors, the issuers actively sought credit ratings.
The demand for rating services grew significantly. The rating agencies took advantage
of this increased demand, and they soon discovered that they could impose charges on
the issuers.
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In 1970, Fitch and Moody’s started to charge the issuers for ratings (Cantor and
Packer 1994). Standard and Poor’s followed a few years later. Standard and Poor’s
started to charge municipal bond issuers for ratings in 1968. Since 1985, about four-fifth
of Standard and Poor’s revenue has come from issuer fees (Ederington and Yawitz 1987).
The fees that the agencies have charged have varied with the size and type o f the
issue. A representative fee on a new long-term corporate bond issue has ranged from 2
to 3 basis points of the principal for each year of rating maintenance. Conversations with
rating agency personnel have revealed that the initial fee ranged from $2,500 to
$100,000. Frequent issuers have often negotiated rates.
The Ratings Process
The ratings process also requires a great amount of time and effort for the debtissuer, the underwriter and the rating agency. The agency usually assigns a staff
committee to vote on a recommendation by a senior analyst. This vote occurs after
presentation and discussion.
An explanatory analysis has usually accompanied a rating assignment. The
assigned rating first went to the issuer and underwriter and subsequently to the public at
large. The dissatisfied issuer often had the opportunity to appeal a rating. However, the
structure of the ratings process has allowed the issuer to present its best case during the
rating process (Ederington and Yawitz 1987). Cantwell(1998a),rankedDuffandPhelps,
the fully solicited agency, as doing a better job of explaining its rating process than any
other rating agency.
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The number o f downgrades in corporate bond ratings has exceeded the number
of upgrades in recent years (Blume, Lim and MacKinlay 1998). Instead of declining
credit quality of U.S. corporate debt, an alternative explanation for this can be related to
the agencies’ changing ratings process. The rating agencies have recently used more
stringent standards ( Blume, Lim and MacKinlay 1998), and the tougher standards have
contributed to the downward trend.
Confidential Ratings

Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch IBCA have offered confidential ratings.
Conversations with Duff and Phelps personnel have revealed that DCR does not offer
confidential ratings. The agencies have offered confidential ratings, known often as
indicators (Gasparino and Hamilton 1998). Some bonds represent a firm’s first issue.
Other issuers offered bonds with a different structure and wanted to know how a bond
might have rated before it went to the market
Critics of these confidential ratings have considered the practice open to abuse and
recommended caution by investors. The key concern has dealt with whether the issuers
would openly “shop around” for the highest ratings and subsequently withhold
assessments they did not like from investors. The investors clearly would have wanted
this withheld information for use in their decisions as to whether or not to buy the bonds.
In effect, the issuers o f the bonds could censor the ratings that they did not like. To
counteract the criticism o f these confidential ratings, Moody’s has reserved the right to
make its confidential assessment public if it suspected the occurrence of ratings shopping
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(Gasparino and Hamilton 1998). Standard & Poor’s and Fitch IBCA have not reserved
this right. Standard & Poor’s and Fitch IBCA has claimed that they had a duty to reveal
confidential ratings, even if bond issuers abused the indicators. Standard & Poor’s
asserted that the issuers had the obligation to follow their own legal and moral standards
(Gasparino and Hamilton 1998).
Ratings and Regulations
Regulators of financial markets and institutions have increasingly utilized ratings
to aid in the task of prudential oversight (Cantor and Packer 1994). Almost all financial
regulators have relied on these ratings. These regulators have included public authorities
which oversee banks, thrifts, insurance firms, securities firms, capital markets, mutual
funds and private pensions.
Cantor and Packer (1994) pointed out that the early regulatory uses of ratings drew
only on the agency distinctions between investment grade securities (those rated BBB and
above), and speculative securities (those rated BB and below). The regulations required
holding extra capital against speculative securities and/or prohibited such investments
altogether (Cantor and Packer 1994). Over time, regulatory capital requirements,
disclosure requirements, and investment prohibitions have increasingly applied to other
grades as well.
The Origins o f Ratings Disagreements
The variety of rating methodologies has often resulted in different ratings among
the agencies. Other differences have resulted from the judgmental element, particularly
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in regard to systematic differences in agencies’ evaluation of acceptable risk levels for
particular categories.
Formal definitions that agencies have published for their various letter ratings
could have contributed to ratings disagreements. However, Cantor and Packer (1994)
asserted that these definitions provide very little insight about rating agency differences.
The agencies often displayed these definitions on their internet sites. The authors stressed
that the definitions implied a different likelihood of default and they could not quantify
the rating differences.
In some instances, the differences among rating agencies resulted from unique
philosophies. For example, Moody’s had a tendency to give a higher rating to an assetbased security that likely would recover most of its principal in the event of default
(Cantor and Packer 1994).
Standard and Poor’s, does not base ratings on expected recoveries. All of the
agencies have focused on expected recoveries in the situation of different classes of debt
issued by the same firm. For example, when a firm defaulted on its subordinated debts,
its senior debt generally went into default However, agencies usually have rewarded
ratings to the senior debt because of higher expected recovery rates. Barclay and Smith
(1995) discussed in detail the maturity structure of corporate debt.
Previous researchers have found

many examples of

rating agencies

implementing unique ratings philosophies. Duffand Phelps has sometimes given higher
ratings for medium-term notes than for longer term securities of the same issuers.
Moody’s has been more hesitant than Standard & Poor’s to assign a higher rating to a
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country’s domestic currency obligations than to its foreign currency obligations (Purcell,
Brown, Chang, and Damrau 1993).
Regulatory Methods for Resolving Ratings Disagreements
Regulations have included methods for dealing with rating disagreements among
agencies. Regulators need to find a method to resolve these differences. Cantor and
Packer (1994) provide two approaches to dealing with the split ratings: explicit rules and
independent analysis.
The majority o f regulations simply have accepted an explicit rule, recognizing
either the highest rating or the second highest rating. The second highest rating rule has
attempted to compromise between a conservative policy (eliminating the highest ratings)
and a liberal policy.

In the years when Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s dominated

the ratings industry, this second highest rating rule effected conservatism because the
second highest rating also served as the lowest rating. The large increase in the number
of nationally recognized statistical rated organizations (NRSROs) has given issuers now
three, four, or more ratings and made this policy much more liberal.
Insurance regulators have conducted independent analyses in order to resolve
disagreements among the agencies (NAIC 1994). Hence, the insurance regulators have
incurred the cost of establishing in-house analytical capacity (Cantor and Packer 1994).
National Association ofInsuranceCommissioners(NAIC)practiceshave assigned
each bond held by an insurance company to one of six quality categories. Category 1
corresponds to AAA, AA, and A; Category 2 corresponds to BBB; category 3
corresponds tp BB; Category 4 corresponds to B; Category 5 or Category 6 corresponds
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to CCC, C or D ratings. Each category has had a different implication for mandatory
reserves (NAIC 1994).
However, the NAIC’s Securities Valuation Office has had the freedom to assign
a rating that differed from the bond’s public credit rating as long as their judgment
implied a downgrade from the respective public credit rating (Cantor and Packer 1994).
Hence, the NAIC has allowed for discarding certain ratings viewed as too high.
Regulatory Rules
The regulatory rules that have been based on the distinction between investment
grade and speculative securities have since expanded. Since 1975, the SEC has required
dealers to hold extra capital against their inventories of speculative or junk bonds.
Congress in 1989 passed legislation that prohibited thrifts from investing in junk bonds
in response to the S&L scandal.
Cantor and Demsetz (1993) showed that the achievement of an investment grade
rating eases the burden of disclosure for the issuer. In 1993, the SEC adopted Rule 3s-7,
which made the investment grade rating a criterion for the public issuance of certain assetbacked securities.
Cantor and Packer (1994) emphasized that regulators increasingly used ratings
other than BBB as thresholds in their rules. Regulations have eased issuance and
enhanced the marketability of bonds rated AAA or AA. Recently the federal reserve
Board also began to implement an AA cutoff in specific prudential rules affecting bank
supervision. Baron and Murch (1993) showed that the single A rating has also served
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as a cutoff. For example, the Labor Department, in its role as overseer of the retirement
funds industry, adopted a regulation in 1988permitting pension fund investments in assetbacked securities rated single-A or better.
Regulations have also impacted ratings on mutual fund investments. In 1991,
the SEC adopted amendments to Rule 2a-7 o f the Investment Company Act of 1940 that
imposed ratings-based restrictions on money market mutual fund investments(Crable and
Post 1992). Following the adoption o f this amendment, mutual fund holding of lower
quality paper fell to zero, and the total amount of lower quality paper outstanding
decreased significantly.
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations

The SEC currently designates five rating agencies as nationally recognized
statistical rating organisations (NRSROs). The other regulators generally rely on the
SEC’s designations. Cantor and Packer (1994) stated that under most current ratingsdependent regulations in the United States, ratings mattered only if an NRSRO issued
them.

Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and Fitch in 1975 received the first NRSRO

designations given by the SEC. Soon other agencies sought NRSRO designation from
the SEC.
In 1982, Duff and Phelps received the designation. In 1991, IBCA received the
designation followed by a 1992 designation for Thomson BankWatch that limited to their
ratings for banks and financial institutions only (Cantor and Packer 1994). In 1983, the
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SEC granted NRSRO status to McCarthy, Crisanti, and Maffei (which had merged into
Duff and Phelps in 1991).
The SEC’s staff analyzes data supplied by the rating agency about its history,
ownership, employees, financial resources, policies and internal procedures (Cantor and
Packer 1994). The SEC requires that the market should have already placed substantial
weight on the judgment of a rating agency in order for the agency to achieve NRSRO
status (SEC 1994). Hence, by giving the market a role in selecting NRSROs, the SEC
intended to not designate agencies which had not already established a reputation for
accurate ratings.

Cantor and Packer (1994) pointed out that the practice favored

incumbents. However, Cantor and Packer should have stated whether or not an NRSRO
agency had ever had that status taken away.
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CHAPTER 3
EMPIRICAL WORK
This study has tested for whether solicitation and independence have affected
the determination of corporate bond ratings. The study has utilized recent ratings data
from the appropriate agencies in order to determine whether providing purely solicited
ratings versus both solicited and unsolicited ratings had an effect It has also attempted
to determine whether agencies that did not take a fee from the issuer provided a
significantly different rating.
Comparison between S&P and Mnndv’s
Jewell and Livingston (1998) provided evidence that when split ratings occurred
in industrial bonds, neither Moody’s nor S&P gave the higher rating a significant
percentage of the time. Perry, Evans and Liu (1991) utilized non-parametric statistics
in order to determine differences in agencies’ ratings. The authors applied the matched
pairs sign test and the Goodman-Kruskal gamma statistic in order to determine whether
Moody’s and S&P ratings differed.

Beattie and Searle (1992) summarized ratings

differences among Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s.
Billingsley, Lamy, Marr and Thompson (1985) concluded that the yields on split
rated bonds did not differ from the yields on bonds without split ratings- As a secondary
25
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finding, the authors noted that investors did not value the ratings of either one of the
major rating agencies above the other.
To be sure, Billingsley, Lamy, Marr and Thompson (1985) provided insight into
split ratings and yields. However, the authors did not consider the effect of modified
ratings. S&P began using modified ratings in 1975; Moody's began in 1982.
Several studies have addressed the issue of split ratings both directly and
indirectly. Those studies produced inconclusive results.
Jewell and Livingston (1998) found split ratings for Moody’s and S&P for 17
percent of industrial debt issuers. Altman (1982) found that 24 percent of the ratings
assigned to bonds of utility companies disagreed. Ederington (1986), in a study of 494
industrial bonds, found no evidence that either Moody’s or S&P consistently rated debt
issues higher than the other service. When split ratings occurred, Ederington (1986),
attributed the variations to intra-agency differences in judgment and inter-agency
disagreements regarding factors other than the publicly available accounting information.
A study by Morton (1975) of municipal bond ratings found that Moody’s gave
more conservative ratings than those assigned by S&P. On the other hand, Cates (1977),
in a study of bank holding companies, found that S&P gave more conservative ratings.
Ederington, Yawitz, and Roberts (1987) found that S&P tended to give ratings
slightly higher than Moody's. However, the results also indicated that the market may
have viewed a given Moody’s rating as signifying a lower level of risk than the same S&P
rating. The authors asserted that since bond ratings indicated risk, the ratings had a direct
effect on the firm's cost of capital.
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In a study of debt issues interest costs, Sorensen (1979) found that interest
averaged 13 basis points higher when S&P gave bond ratings lower than Moody’s. Costs
averaged 17 basis points lower when S&P gave the higher bond ratings than Moody's.
Agency Satisfaction
The 1997 International Survey of Credit Ratings (Cantwell 1998a) of more than
two hundred thirty issuers rated Duff & Phelps the best in most major categories of
service among DCR, Moody’s , Standard & Poor’s, Fitch IBCA, and Thomson
Bankwatch. A high percentage of corporate treasurers had found rating agency analysts
unqualified (Cantwell 1998b). The survey respondents participated in face-to-face
meetings with the five rating agencies. The highest satisfaction with preparation by the
lead analysts of the agencies was with Duff and Phelps. Moody’s registered the lowest
satisfaction rate. The survey also found that the high turnover rate at Moody’s caused
much dissatisfaction with the agency. More than 25 percent of the issuers said that they
did not deal with the same primary Moody’s analyst year-to-year. It is important to stress
that the significance of a issuer satisfaction with a totally solicited agency is revealed in
the results of the 1997 survey. This independent survey conducted by the U.S.-based
consulting firm of Cantwell & Co. asked the issuers to rate the performance of Duff and
Phelps, Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, Fitch IBCA, and Thomson BankWatch.

The

issuers selected Duff and Phelps’ as the clear favorite in most of the key categories
(Cantwell 1998a).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

28
The respondents praised Duff and Phelps' analysts for their preparedness and
more knowledge about rated companies, industries and credits than analysts from any
other agency. Duff and Phelps also did a better job of explaining its methodology and
its rating process than any other agency (Cantwell 1998a).
Reaction to Rating Downgrades and Upgrades
Akhigbe, Madura, and Whtye (1997) pointed out that if the rating agencies had
relevant information about firms not known by the market at the time of the rating change
announcement, rating adjustments should induce a market response. The authors found
significant negative valuation effects for rating downgrades.
In investigating the market reaction to bond downgradings, Bi and Levy (1993)
concluded that the market could distinguish between firms with identical downgradings
when one firm eventually filed for bankruptcy and the other firm did not file for
bankruptcy. In other words, investors could discriminate between potentially failing and
surviving firms. Similarly, Clark, Delva, and Foster (1993) investigated the relationship
between bond rating changes and beta changes.

The authors found a positive

relationship between these two summary risk measures. This result also added to the
credibility of the information content of rating changes.
Numerous studies have shown that the stock market reacted negatively to bond
downgrade announcements. These studies include: Matolcsy and Lianto (1995); Hand,
Holthausen, and Leftwich (1992); Cornell, Landsman, and Shapiro (1989), and Wansley
and Clauetie (1985). Those studies also showed that downgrades (upgrades) tended to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

29
occur following periods ofnegative (positive)abnormal returns (Holthausen and Leftwich
(1986), Wansley and Clauretie (1985).
An analysis of forecast revisions around rating changes has helped explain why
the market has reacted to downgrades but not upgrades. Ederington and Goh (1998)
provided evidence that the differential response to downgrades and upgrades occurred
because issuers voluntarily released favorable information but they reluctantly release
unfavorable information. Another finding is that the rating agencies spent more effort in
detecting deteriorations in credit quality than in improvements in credit quality.
Matolcsy and Lianto (1995) analyzed the incremental information content ofbond
rating revisions. The authors controlled for the information content ofannual accounting
income numbers. The results showed that only the announcement ofbond downgrades
had this incremental information content. Ederington and Goh (1998) also revealed that
the market reacted to downgrade information more quickly and efficiently than did
analysts.
Chandra and Nayar (1998) tested whether downgrades (upgrades) occurred
because the rating agencies revised their expectation o f future cash flows or because
the rating agencies revised their evaluations of cash flows riskiness. Using analysts’
earnings forecasts, the authors determined whether commercial paper rating downgrades
occurred because of changes in expected cash flows or changes in perceived riskiness.
Chandra and Nayar found that both mild and severe commercial paper downgrades
coincided with downward revisions in earnings expectations. Furthermore, severe
downgrades also seemed to coincide with rises in perceived riskiness.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

30
Did earnings forecasts bring more information to the market?. In a related sense,
how did ratings compare with earnings forecasts in terms of timeliness?
Stock analysts outnumbered rating agencies. In addition, analysts focused
specifically on the outlook of the firm’s equity (Ederington and Goh 1998). However, the
rating agencies had access to, and obtain feedback from, top management. Stock analysts
did not have such access.

Specifically, the rating agencies have access to such

information as board meetings minutes, feedback on profit breakdowns by product, and
new product plans (Ederington and Yawitz 1987). The rating agencies claim that even
their own stock analysts do not have access to such information.
Clark, Foster, and Ghani (1997) expanded the investigation into the relationship
between bond rating changes and analysts’ earnings forecasts. They showed that rating
changes communicate valuable new information about small firms.
This study consisted of440 firms with downgraded bonds between 1986 and 1990
which were reported in Standard & Poor’s Credit Week.

The authors used the

methodology described in Brous (1992) to test the response in analysts’ forecasts to
downward bond ratings changes.
Clark, Foster and Ghani found that bond rating changes provide significant new
information about the short-term prospects of small firms. Hence, the authors concluded
that rating agencies diminished information asymmetries in the capital markets by
communicating information about firms which tended to operate in less precise
information environments.
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In addition, Clark, Foster, and Ghani found that analysts’ earnings forecasts were
subject to optimism bias. O’Brien (1988) and Brous (1992) revealed this point. The
authors showed that expected forecast revisions did not equal zero. Brous (1992) found
a serial correlation for monthly forecast revisions because not all analysts updated their
forecasts on a monthly basis. Hence, the authors concluded that revisions preceding an
announcement month had utility in estimating forecast revisions. The number of
downgrades in corporate bond ratings has exceeded the number of upgrades in recent
years (Blume, Lim, and MacKinlay 1998).
Bond Ratines and Default Rates
Numerous studies have associated lower corporate bond ratings with higher
probabilities of default Moody’s Investors Service (1994) summarized many o f these
results. Moody’s Investors Service provided a review of the default rates among rated
issuers between 1970 and 1993. All bonds rated A and above had one-year default rates
of zero. The one-year default rate increased to .2 percent for BBB issuers, and 1.8 and
8.3 percent for BB and B rated issuers, respectively.
The Moody’s study calculated a weighted-average cumulative default rate. This
default rate complemented the weighted-average marginal survival rates.
The default probabilities across Moody’s rating categories changed as the time
horizon increased to five, ten, and fifteen years. Whereas the default probability increased
with the time horizon for each rating category, the negative relation between default
probability and ratings remained intact In a similar manner, Brand, Kitto, and Bahar
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(1994) conduct a historical default study covering bonds rated by Standard & Poor’s
between 1981 and 1993. This study confirmed the conclusions drawn from the longer
term study of Moody’s (1994).
In both studies, the probability of default rose most dramatically with a breach in
the investment grade barrier. This result agreed with the historical importance of the
investment grade/non-investment-grade distinction.

The Moody’s (1994) study

discovered a six times higher default probability for bonds rated BB than for those rated
BBB over a five-year horizon. However, B-rated versus BB-rated issues had a much
lower default probability (at 2.2), than did BBB-rated versus A-rated issues at (3.2).
Cantor and Packer (1994) also summarized these results.

Brand, Kitto and Bahar

(1994), using the Standard & Poor’s data, produced ratios of 4.8 (BB versus BBB), 3.0
(BBB versus A), and 1.9 (B versus BB), respectively.
Cantor and Packer (1994) pointed out that the agencies made changes based
simply on the business-cycle considerations even though the frequency of defaults within
rating categories clearly increased in recessions. Fons (1991) asserted that cyclical
variations in Moody’s ratings on outstanding bonds could not explain most of the
aggregate corporate bonds default rate. In addition, yield spreads between high- and
low-rated bonds tended to increase during recessions. Market pricing therefore changed
in a pattern consistent with a perceived increase in the default probabilities of lower rated
issues relative to those o f higher rated issues during recessions. Fons pointed out that,
alternatively, the decline in economic growth may have merely reflected a concurrent
increase in either the market’s dislike of default risk or other supply and demand factors.
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Fons also asserted that cyclical variability in short-tem default rates inevitably resulted
from a longer term perspective. Long-term default probabilities at the different respective
rating levels, therefore should have exhibited relative stability when they embed specific
credit rating thresholds into both law and regulation (Cantor and Packer 1994). The
authors used Moody’s data between 1970 and 1994 to review the progress of five-year
cumulative default rates for investment-grade and non-investment-grade bonds. Noninvestment-grade bonds initially spike in 1970. This spike originated from the default
of Penn Central and twenty-six other railroad companies. Default rates also rose
dramatically in 1971. Since then, the cumulative default rate within rating classes BBB
and below has risen about threefold (Cantor and Packer 1994). From 1971 to 1989 the
rate increased from 0.4 percent to 0.8 percent for A-rated bonds; 1.1 percent to 3.2
percent for BBB-rated bonds; 5.1 percent to 19.7 percent for BB-rated bonds, and 11.1
percent to 34.3 percent for B-rated bonds.
Cantor and Packer (1994) showed that though five-year default rates increased
during the 1980s growth of the junk bond market, the deterioration in performance
occurred in both investment grade and non-investment-grade bonds. The increasing trend
in default rates originally related to the early 1980's recession, but it continued
throughout the decade.
Bond Ratings for Banks
Bond ratings mattered greatly to banks. The ratings have an important effect on
counterparty exposure limits, letters of credit, and nondeposit sources of funds (Cantor
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and Packer 1994). International ratings have comprised a large percentage o f banking
industry ratings.
Moody’s rated a significantly higher percentage of banks than did Standard and
Poor’s. In 1994, Moody’s rated 64 percent of U.S. banks, whereas Standard and Poor’s
rated 55 percent (Financial Times 1994).
Cantor and Packer (1994) pointed out that agencies appeared to disagree in their
measurement of credit risks for banks more than in their risk measurement for other
industries. However, Cantor and Packer’ study would have benefitted from the inclusion
of Thomson Bankwatch ratings.
Ratings for banks in recent years have trended downward. In February 1995,
Moody’s downgraded Morgan Guaranty trust from Aaa to Aal. This change had
symbolic importance because for the first time since Moody’s began rating banks, no e
U.S. holding company or subsidiary carried an AAA rating.
Bond Ratings for Insurance Firms
Two agencies, A.M. Best and Weiss Ratings, have specialized in rating insurance
firms. A.M. has published both solicited and unsolicited ratings, whereas Weiss Ratings
has published only unsolicited ratings.
In 1994, the General Accounting Office, at the request of Congress, completed a
study on agency ratings for life/health insurers (General Accounting Office 1994). The
report compared the ratings systems of the five life/health insurer raters of life/health
insurers: A.M. Best, Duff and Phelps, Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s and Weiss Ratings
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(Weiss) over the period 1989 to 1992. The report also determined which rating agency
first reported the vulnerability of financially impaired or insolvent insurers.
The GAO report clearly showed that the agencies used different approaches and
methods to rate insurer financial health. Weiss placed far less reliance than the other
agencies on analysts’ judgment. Only Weiss rated more than half of all insurers. In
addition, Moody’s and Weiss proved less likely than the other agencies to assign insurers
their top ratings (General Accounting Office 1994).
The unique rating scales of Weiss and A.M. Best created conversion and
comparison obstacles forthe GAO study. For example, an A+represented Weiss’ highest
rating; A.M. Best’s second-highest rating; and Duff and Phelps, Standard and Poor’s ,
and Moody’s (converted) fifth-highest rating. In addition, during the GAO study, A.M.
Best changed its rating system twice. A.M.. Best added new ratings during this time
period and changed the existing ratings definition.
Agencies used

the two-category secure/vulnerable classification in rating

insurance firms. Among these five agencies, Weiss first assigned ‘Vulnerable” ratings
in five of the six large insurance company failures.

A.M. Best first assigned a

“vulnerable” rating to the sixth largest insurance company that failed. However, the
GAO study did not take into account the number of companies that each agency rated as
vulnerable. Weiss rated more companies as vulnerable and therefore had a statistical
advantage on the GAO’s tests.
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Rating Agencies and Stock Analysts
Both rating agencies and stock analysts have evaluated publicly traded firms and
communicated their findings to investors. Ederington and Goh (1998) examined the
information that the rating agencies and the stock analysts provided and when they
provided it The authors used changes in both actual earnings and analysts’ forecasts of
future earnings around bond rating changes by Moody’s over the period 1984-1990.
Ederington and Goh (1998) stressed that bond ratings should communicate
information to investors and that bad (good) news to bondholders did not necessarily
constitute bad (good) news to stockholders. But Goh and Ederington (1993) provided
evidence that most downgrades indicated a downward revision in the issuer’s prospective
cash flows, which is bad news for both bondholders and stockholders.
In addition, analysts might have altered their earnings forecast, if they thought an
unexpected rating change would affect the issuer’s future interest costs.
Declining Corporate Debt Ratines
U.S. corporate debt ratings has been declining since 1970 . A comprehensive
study by Lucas and Lonski (1992) of Moody’s corporate debt rating changes concludes
that the credit quality of U.S. corporate debt decreased between 1970 and 1990. In 1970,
Moody’s downgraded 21 issues and upgraded 23 issues. Over the next two decades, the
number of bonds downgraded greatly exceeded the number upgraded. By 1990, the study
shows that Moody’s downgraded 301 issues and upgraded only 61. This trend applies to
both investment and non-investment grade bonds.
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However, the key question is whether these declining ratings signify a decrease
in the credit quality of U.S. corporate debt. Two studies attribute the declining ratings
to more stringent rating standards (Pender (1992) and Blume, Lim and MacKinlay
(1998)). According to these two, there may be either no decline in credit quality or the
decline is less than the data suggest
Blume, Lim and MacKinlay (1998) use data from 1978 to 1995 to determine
whether a firm that maintains the same values for both its accounting measures and its
equity risk measures over time receive a lower rating in 1995 than in past years. The
authors utilize ordered probit analysis to find that the rating standards have become more
stringent In fact the authors conclude that if it were not for the utilization of more
stringent rating standards, the level ofbond ratings would actually have been higher than
in the past
However, there are limitations to Blume, Lim and MacKinlay’s conclusions. The
authors state that their results do not eliminate the possibility that the informational
content of a specific variable has changed over time. An example of this point is that it
is reasonable to believe that a firm had maintained the same leverage ratio over time may
still find it more difficult to service its debt as the years went by.
Another limitation to their results is that other information not incorporated by the
authors may indicate a decrease in credit quality. Such other information can be
information privately available to the respective rating agencies (Blume, Lim, and
MacKinlay 1998). The authors also limit their data to the ratings of Moody’s and S&P.
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CHAPTER 4
HYPOTHESES
This study has sought to determine the effect of solicitation and independence on
corporate bond ratings. It has addressed the significant potential biases endemic to
agencies who have provided strictly solicited ratings or a combination of solicited ratings
and unsolicited ratings.
The independent agency, which accepted no fee from the issuer, should have
provided true ratings free from biases. Previously, no one has published analyses on these
issues. In order to test these issues, this study explored seven hypotheses. When a null
hypothesis is rejected, multiple comparison tests are conducted.
The Ratings Difference Hypothesis

Testing for the effect of solicitation on corporate bond ratings required empirical
research comparing the ratings of the four full-scale rating agencies, utilizing a recent
month. Hypothesis One provided this test
Hypothesis One
H oi: The ratings of the four full-scale bond rating agencies did not differ.

38
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H al: At least one o f the four full-scale bond rating agencies’ (S&P, Moody’s
Fitch IBCA and Duff & Phelps) had different ratings.
Non-rejection of Hoi would indicate that performing totally solicited ratings or
both solicited and unsolicited ratings would not affect the determination of the particular
agency’s ratings. Hence, a significant fee for a solicited rating would not bias the ratings
upward.

The fully solicited firm might more rapidly or more slowly upgrade or

downgrade, but its ratings would not differ from those of the other full-scale bond rating
agencies.
Rejection of Ho 1would indicate a fee might have influenced the agency’s ratings.
This would require multiple comparison tests to determine if in fact one agency differed
from the other three.
A sample selection bias might have caused higher ratings by Duff and Phelps
and/or Fitch IBCA. Traditionally, issuers have sought the ratings of the two smaller fullscale bond rating agencies when they had significant expectation of improving upon the
ratings of either Moody’s or Standard & Poor’s. However, this had more validity in the
1970’s, 1980's and early 1990's. By March 1998, Duff and Phelps and Fitch IBCA had
experienced dramatic growth. Issuers have in recent years sought the ratings of Duffand
Phelps and Fitch IBCA without regard to significant expectation of improving upon the
ratings o f either Moody’s or Standard & Poor’s.
In addition, the multiple comparison test would determine if the ratings differed
between Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s. Numerous studies have compared the ratings
of these two firms in earlier years; this study utilizes the data through March, 1998. For
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the most part, the ratings o f these two agencies in the years prior to the Justice
Department investigation which began in 1997, have not significantly differed. This
present study therefore can help to determine whether the recent Justice Department
investigation of Moody’s has caused its ratings to differ from Standard and Poor’s.
Upon rejection o f H oi, multiple comparison tests would also determine if the
ratings of Fitch IBCA differed from those of the other three full-scale bond rating
agencies. Until 1996, Fitch did not perform unsolicited ratings. Hence, this study —
using the data for March 1998 —has incorporated the use of unsolicited ratings for Fitch
IBCA. If the ratings o f Fitch IBCA differed from the ratings of Duffand Phelps, the use
of unsolicited ratings by Fitch IBCA apparently contributed to this difference.
Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s has published more unsolicited ratings than
Fitch IBCA. Had they published lower ratings than Duff and Phelps, that could have
provided evidence that solicitation led to inappropriately higher ratings. If the Standard
and Poor’s and Moody’s ratings did not differ significantly, it would reinforce that
conclusion.
If Fitch IBCA had issued lower ratings than Duff and Phelps, this result would
provide evidence that the utilization of unsolicited ratings by Fitch IBCA since 1996 has
produced more accurate ratings. This result could also have meant that Fitch IBCA
punished issuers for not paying for its ratings. The timeliness hypotheses would provide
insight in determining whether this occurred.
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The Timeliness Hypotheses
The timeliness criterion crucially affected evaluations of solicitation and
independence effects upon corporate bond ratings.

Testing the impact of solicitation

required comparison of the four full-scale bond rating agencies. Hypotheses Two and
Three tested the timeliness criterion. Procedurally, the study had to first determine the
result of Hypothesis One. Rejection of H oi, would indicate a fully solicited agency
ratings bias, even if Ho2 is not rejected.
Hypothesis Two
Ho2: All four full-scale bond ratings agencies upgraded their ratings at the same
time.
Ha2: At least one of the four full-scale bond rating agencies’ upgraded its ratings
at an earlier time.
Non-rejection of Ho2 would indicate that a totally solicited agency might bias its
ratings upwards, and reluctantly take a conspicuous role in doing so.
Rejection of Ho2 would indicate that a totally solicited agency not only biased
its ratings upwards (depending upon the results of Hypothesis One) but it also willingly
took a conspicuous role in doing so. Therefore, upon rejection of Ho2, multiple
comparison tests would have determined if Duff and Phelps upgraded its ratings earlier.
Hypothesis Three
Ho3: The four full-scale bond ratings agencies all simultaneously downgraded
their ratings at the same time.
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Ha3: At least one o f the four full-scale bond rating agencies downgraded its
ratings at an earlier time.
Non-rejection of Ho3 would indicate that a totally solicited rating agency did not
hesitate to lower ratings. This result would provide important evidence that solicited or
highly solicited agencies had incentives to provide true ratings if it meant upsetting the
issuers.
Rejection of Ho3 would create the need for multiple comparison tests.

If

Moody’s had downgraded earlier than DCR and Fitch IBCA, and if Standard and Poor’s
also had downgraded earlier than DCR and Fitch IBCA, these results would have
indicated that the hilly or predominantly solicited agency had incentives to only
reluctantly provide true ratings. This result would also have indicated that DCR and
Fitch hesitated to upset the issuers. Hence, Hypothesis Three served a crucial role in
detennining the effect of solicitation on the timeliness of bond ratings
The Magnitude Hypotheses
The incorporation of magnitude of the upgrades and downgrades required testing
another dimension of the effect of solicitation on corporate bond ratings. This test,
although not as macro-oriented as timeliness, could provide additional evidence about
the effect of solicitation.

The magnitude criterion would indicate an upgrade and

downgrade greater than one rank. For example a downgrade o f three ranks in magnitude
occured when Fitch IBCA downgraded Advanta Corporation from a BBB (11) to a BB
(8) in February 1998. As another example, Duff and Phelps downgraded Aames
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Financial Corporation by four ranks in November 1998.

Hypothesis Four and

Hypothesis Five tested for magnitude upgrades and downgrades.
Hypothesis Four
Ho4: All four full-scale bond rating agencies provided an equivalent upgrade
magnitude.
Ha4: At least one o f the four full-scale bond rating agencies has a different
upgrade magnitude.
Non-rejection of Ho4 would indicate that magnitude upgrades provided no
additional evidence that solicitation affected corporate bond ratings.
Rejection of Ho4 would indicate the need for multiple comparison tests. If either
or both S&P or Moody’s had a larger upgrade magnitude than DCR, this result would
indicate that either S&P or Moody’s (or both) willingly led in not only upgrading an
issuer first but that it also conspicuously did so. DCR would have had an incentive to
less conspicuously provide an upgrade or downgrade magnitude, because DCR, alone
among bond rating agencies, honored an issuer’s request to not rate its bonds.

In

addition, an entirely solicited agency such as DCR would have had an incentive to shift
its ratings by only one level.
Hypothesis Five
HoS: The downgrade magnitudes of the four full-scale bond rating agencies did
not significantly differ.
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Ha5: At least one o f the four full-scale bond rating agencies had a different
downgrade magnitude.
Non-rejection of Ho5 would indicate a lack of additional evidence about the
impact of solicitation on corporate bond ratings.
Rejection of Ho5 would indicate a need for multiple comparison tests.

If

Moody’s and/or S&P had a larger downgrade magnitude than DCR and/or Fitch, it
would indicate that the fully or highly solicited agencies has more concern about
alienating the issuers. This conclusion would have had special validity if both Moody’s
and S&P had a larger downgrade magnitude than DCR, and both Moody’s and S&P have
a larger downgrade magnitude than Fitch.

An absence of differences in downgrade

magnitude between Moody’s and S&P, and between Fitch and DCR would also add
validity.
The Independence Hypotheses
Hypothesis Six and Hypothesis Seven test whether fee-related independence had
an effect on corporate bond ratings. The firm McCarthy, Crisnati, and Maffei (MCM),
an independent agency, did not take a fee from the issuers.
Hypothesis Six
Ho6: The bond ratings of S&P, Moody’s, and MCM did not differ.
Ha6: At least one of the three bond rating agencies’ (S&P, Moody’s, and MCM)
published different ratings.
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Acceptance (or non-rejection) o f Ho6 would indicate that independence did not
affect bond ratings. This result would indicate an absence o f potential conflictd of
interest when the issuer compensated the agency. Also this would indicate that an
independent agency could not claim advantage in providing the true rating.
Hence, non-rejection of Ho6 would obviate the need for additional research on
Egan-Jones, a “modern-day MCM” and an independent bond rating agency.
Rejection of Ho6 would indicate that the independence criterion would have
affected corporate bond ratings. This would have created the need for multiple
comparison tests. Lower ratings by MCM than those of both Moody’s and S&P would
have reinforced this conclusion as would identical ratings by Moody’s and S&P.
Rejection of Ho6 would indicate a potential conflict of interest when the bond
issuer compensated the rating agency.

The independence could have allowed the

independent agency to express themselves more forcefully than the giant agencies. The
independent agency could have more easily asserted that a particular issuer had a positive
or negative effect on bondholders. This result would have allowed the independent
agency to claim that subscribers should only pay for the agency services.

A fully

unsolicited agency would not have had the biases endemic to the agencies that provide
both solicited ratings and unsolicited ratings.
Rejection of Ho6 would create a need to do research on an active independent
agency such as Egan-Jones. MCM originated in 1975, Xerox Financial Services
subsequently acquired it, and its fixed income rating and research service merged into
Duff and Phelps in 1991.
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The rejection of H06 would indicate that the new independent rating agency,
Egan-Jones could have charged higher prices for its research, and this would have
enhanced its financial viability. Approximately eighty percent of S&P’s revenue came
from issuer fees. Rejection o f Ho6 would also have indicated that the investment
community could have questioned the accuracy of the ratings ofthe giant agencies. S&P
and Moody’s would likely face additional competition from newer independent agencies.
This could have caused heavy scrutiny of Moody’s and S&P.

The threat of legal

liability for both S&P and Moody’s could have materialized as a result of that scrutiny.
Hypothesis Seven
Ho7: S&P, Moody’s, and MCM all upgraded their ratings at the same time.
Ha7: At least one o f the three bond rating agencies (S&P, Moody’s, and MCM)
upgraded its ratings at an earlier time.
Non-rejection of Ho7, would indicate the independent agency’s willingness to
conspicuously adjust their ratings. The independent agency could not claim that the big
agencies followed the little independent agency and the customers of MCM would not
have benefitted on bond upgrades because no one would have provided that advanced
word.
Rejection of Ho7 would create the need for multiple comparison tests. If MCM
had changed it upgrade ratings earlier, this result would have indicated that the customers
of the independent agency received superior service as these customers received
advanced word on bond upgrades. Moody’s and S&P would likely have faced more
competition would from newer independentagencies. These agencies could have attained

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

47
financial viability by charging higher fees for its ratings and publications. Inaccurate
ratings provided by Moody’s and S&P could have exposed these two agencies to costly
legal liability. Investors could have lost confidence in the timeliness of the ratings of the
two larger agencies. In addition, more appeals of the ratings given by S&P and Moody’s
would likely have occurred.
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CHAPTER 5
METHODS AND SAMPLE
The objective o f this study is to determine the effect of solicitation and
independence on corporate bond ratings. An interesting aspect o f this study is whether
there are significant potential biases endemic to agencies that provide strictly solicited
ratings or a combination o f solicited and unsolicited ratings.
The bond ratings assigned by all of the agencies indicated the likelihood of
default or delayed interest payment. The ratings ranked the risks of default from
extremely safe to highly speculative. The agencies have long had their own system of
symbols. Some have used letters, some have used numbers, and some have used both.
Gradually, however, a correspondence among the major agencies' ratings has emerged.
In order to provide more distinct rating gradations to help investors distinguish more
carefully among issuers, the agencies started attaching plus and minus symbols to their
ratings. In 1973, Fitch became the first agency to start using the plus/minus system.
Standard and Poor’s followed in 1974. Moody’s implemented this system in 1982.
In addition, the grading schemes have undergone other modifications.

One

modification, the addition of a “credit watch” category, denoted that rating is under
review.
48
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The ratings systems employed by S&P, Moody’s, Fitch IBCA, Duff and Phelps
(DCR) and MCM employed identical ratings based on a letter scale. However, Moody’s
utilized a unique ratings code. Table 2 standardizes the letter scales for all five agencies
into numbers in order to facilitate the nonparametric tests. Table 2 displays these ratings
conversions. The rating agency definitions for the Table 2 ratings are synthesized in
Table 3.

Table 2: Ratings Converted to Numbers
S&P, Fitch, MCM, DCR

Moody’s

Ratings

AAA

Aaa

19

AA+

Aal

18

AA

Aa2

17

AA-

Aa3

16

A+

A1

15

A

A2

14

A-

A3

13

BBB+

Baal

12

BBB

Baa2

11

BBB-

Baa3

10

BB+

Bal

9

BB

Ba2

8

BB-

Ba3

7

B+

B1

6

B

B2

5
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Table 2: (continued)

S&P, Fitch, MCM, DCR

Moody’s

Ratings

B-

B3

4

CCC+

Caa

3

CCC

Ca

2

CCC-

C

1

Table 3: Definitions of Ratings
Rating

Definition

19

Highest credit quality. The risk factors are negligible and are only
slightly higher than for risk-fiee U.S. Treasury debt.

18

High credit quality.

17

The protection factors are strong. Risk is modest

16

Risk may vary from time to time because of economic conditions.

15

The protection factors are average but adequate.

14

The risk factors are more variable.

13

The risk factors are especially variable in period of economic stress.

12

The protection factors are below average but still considered
sufficient.

11

Considerable variability in risk.

10

Considerable variability in risk especially during economic cycles.

9

Below investment grade but deemed to meet obligations.

8

Present or prospective financial protection factors fluctuate.

7

Overall quality moves up or down frequently.
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Table 3: (continued)
Rating

Definition

6

Below investment grade and possessing risk that obligations will not
be met when due.

5

Financial protection factors will fluctuate widely according to
economic cycles, industry conditions and/or company fortunes.

4

Potential exists for frequent changes in the rating. Considerable risk
that obligations will not be met when due.

3

Well below investment-grade securities. Considerable uncertainty
exists as to timely payment of principal and interest

2

Protection factors are narrow and risk can be substantial with
unfavorable economic/industry conditions, and/or with unfavorable
company developments.

1

Defaulted debt obligations. Issuer failed to meet scheduled principal
and/or interest payments.

Data for Hypotheses One thru Five
Hypotheses One, Two, Three, Four, Five compared ratings from the S&P Bond
Guide, Moody's Bond Record and the Internet sites for Fitch IBCA and Duff and Phelps
forthe years 1993>1998. Hypothesis One utilized the March 1998 rating guides for each
agency.

The data for the four agencies' ratings for the years 1993 to 1998 were

formulated into an 140-page spreadsheet.
Data for Hypotheses Six and Seven
The data used to test Hypothesis Six, whether the ratings of Moody’s, S&P and
MCM differed came from a sample o f203 firms rated by Moody’s, S&P, and MCM in

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

52
September 1989. The data for Hypothesis Six were obtained from MCM Fixed Income
Ratinos - Sept 30, 1989, Moody's Bond Record - Sept 1989 and Standard and Poor's

Corporation Bond Guide - Sept 1989. The data for Hypothesis Seven were obtained from
MCM Ratings Perspectives including Eleven Year Comparison of MCM. Moodv’s and
S&P Ratings (1989). This perspective is a comparison of MCM, Moody's and S&P
among issuers from 1978 to 1989.
The issues for all seven hypotheses consisted of long-term bonds (which included
debentures), mortgage bonds (secured), and unsecured bonds and notes. The inclusion
of these bonds broadened the sample to increase external validity.
The sample includes only bonds currently traded whose maturity date is after
January 1999. Hence, all of the bonds are non-expired.
Methodology
The Friedman Two-Way Analysis of Variance by Ranks test is applied to test
Hypotheses One, Two, Three, Four, Five, and Hypothesis Seven. The Aligned Ranks test
is used to test Hypothesis Six. When an hypothesis is rejected, the study employed a
multiple-comparison procedure for use with the particular test. This study used the
randomized complete block design to test all seven hypotheses.
For Hypothesis One, the randomized complete block design block is employed
on 94 issuers. The randomized complete block design is also used to test Hypotheses
Two, Three, For, Five, Six, and Seven. This blocking design effectively eliminated
extraneous noise.
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Hypothesis One
There are 94 issuers that were rated by four full-scale agencies in March 1998
which comprise the sample used to test Hypothesis One.
Three assumptions must be met in order to effectively utilize the Friedman twoway analysis of variance by ranks test The first assumption deals with the data
consisting of b mutually independent samples (blocks) of size k. The data for Hypothesis
One consist of 94 mutually independent blocks of size of four units. In Table 4, the rows
(issuers) are called blocks and the columns (agencies) are called treatments. The ranks
are based on a 1.0 to 4.0 scale adjusted forties, with the rank 1.0 being the agency given
the highest rating and the rank 4.0 being the agency given the lowest rating within the
respective block.
The second assumption is that there is no interaction between blocks and
consumers. This assumption is met. The third assumption is that the observations
within each block are in rank order. The agencies within each block (issuer) are in rank
order.

Table 4: Ranks for Hypothesis One
Fitch

Duff
AAMES FINANCIAL
ADVANTA CORP
ALABAMA POWER
ALLIEDSIGNAL

1.5
1.0
3.0
1.5

1.5
2.5
1.0
1.5

Moody S&P
3.5
3.5
2.5
4.0
3.0
3.0
3.5
3.5
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Table 4: (continued)
D uff
APPALACHIAN POWER CO
ARISTAR INC
ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE
ASSOCIATES CORP
AT&T CAPITAL CORP
BALLY TOTAL FITNESS
BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO
BANKAMERICA CORP
BANKERS TRUST CORP
BARNETT BANKS INC
CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORP
CENTRAL HUDSON GAS & ELECTRIC
CHASE MANHATTAN
CHRYSLER CORP
CHRYSLER FINANCIAL
CINCINNATI GAS & ELECTRIC CO
CITGO PETROLEUM CORP
CITICORP
CITIZENS UTILITIES CO
CLEVELAND ELECTRIC
CMS ENERGY CORP
COLUMBUS SOUTHERN POWER
COMMERCIAL CREDIT CO
CONSUMERS ENERGY CO
DONALDSON LUFKIN & JENRETTE
EL PASO ELECTRIC CO
ENRON CORP.
ENSERCH CORP
EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE
FINOVA CAPITAL CORP
FLEET FINANCIAL GROUP INC
FORD MOTOR CO
FRONTIER CORP
FRONTIER ASSOCIATES
GTE CORP
GULF POWER CO
HELLER FINANCIAL INC
HOUSEHOLD FINANCE CORP
HOUSEHOLD INTERNATIONAL INC

2.0
1.5
4.0
2.5
2.0
1.0
1.5
3.0
2.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
3.5
2.0
2.0
4.0
2.5
2.0
2.5
2.0
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.0
1.5
2.0
2.0
1.0
3.0
1.5
2.0
3.5
3.5
2.5
3.0
1.5
1.5
1.5
2.0

Fitch Moody S&P
2.0
2.0
4.0
3.0
1.5
4.0
1.0
2.5
2.5
2.5
1.0
4.0
3.5
3.5
1.0
3.0
2.0
4.0
1.5
3.5
3.5
3.0
1.0
3.0
2.5
1.0
4.0
3.5
3.5
1.5
3.0
1.5
4.0
1.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
1.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
4.0
2.0
2.0
4.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
4.0
2.5
1.0
4.0
2.0
2.0
1.0
2.5
4.0
2.0
4.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
4.0
2.5
2.5
2.5
3.0
1.0
3.0
1.5
1.5
4.0
3.5
1.5
3.5
4.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
4.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
1.0
3.0
3.0
1.5
4.0
4.0
2.0
2.0
3.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
3.5
2.5
2.5
2.5
1.5
1.5
4.0
3.0
1.5
4.0
4.0
1.5
3.0
3.5
1.5
3.5
2.0
2.0
4.0
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Table 4: (continued)

HOUSTON INDUSTRIES
IBM CREDIT CORP.
ILLINOIS POWER CO
INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO
INDIANAPOLIS POWER & LIGHT CO
INTERPOOL INC
ITT CORPORATION
nr INDUSTRIES INC.
J.P. MORGAN & CO INC
KENTUCKY POWER CO
LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS
LEHMAN BROTHERS INC
LOCKHEED MARTIN CORP
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING
MATTEL INC.
MDU RESOURCES GROUP INC
MELLON BANK CORP
MERRILL LYNCH & CO
MICHIGAN CONSOLIDATED GAS CO
MISSISSIPPI POWER CO
MONTANA POWER CO
NABISCO INC
NATIONAL CITY CORP
NEVADA POWER CO
NORAM ENERGY CORP
NORTHERN INDIANA
NORTHWEST PIPELINE
NORWEST FINANCIAL INC
OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM
OHIO POWER CO
PACIFICORP
PANENERGY CORP
PANHANDLE EASTERN PIPE LINE
PDV AMERICA INC
PHH CORPORATION
POTOMAC ELECTRIC POWER
PSI ENERGY INC
PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS
REPUBLIC NEW YORK

Fitch Moody
Duff
3.5
1.5
1.5
3.0
1.0
3.0
2.5
2.5
1.0
2.5
2.5
1.0
2.5
1.0
2.5
1.0
4.0
2.0
3.0
1.0
3.0
3.0
1.5
1.5
4.0
1.0
2.5
1.0
3.0
4.0
4.0
2.0
2.0
4.0
3.0
1.5
3.0
1.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.5
3.5
1.5
2.5
2.5
2.5
3.5
1.5
1.5
3.5
1.5
1.5
3.0
3.0
1.0
2.5
1.0
4.0
3.5
1.5
3.5
2.5
2.5
2.5
3.0
2.0
1.0
3.5
2.0
3.5
2.0
2.0
2.0
4.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
3.0
3.0
1.0
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.5
1.5
3.5
1.5
2.5
1.0
4.0
3.0
1.0
4.0
2.5
1.0
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.5
1.5
1.5
3.5
3.5
1.0
2.0
4.0
2.5
1.0
4.0
2.0
2.0
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S&P
3.5
3.0
4.0
4.0
4.0
3.0
3.0
4.0
2.5
2.0
2.0
1.5
3.0
1.0
1.5
2.5
3.5
3.5
3.0
2.5
1.5
2.5
4.0
1.0
4.0
2.0
4.0
3.0
2.5
2.5
3.5
2.5
2.0
4.0
2.5
3.5
3.5
2.5
2.0
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Table 4: (continued)

o o

f

RJR NABISCO INC
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO
SOUTHERN INDIANA GAS & ELECTRIC
CMC SECURITIES CORP
ELECTRONIC DATA SYSTEMS
FIFTH THIRD BANCORP
FIRST REPUBLIC BANK
GEON COMPANY
MEGO MORTGAGE CORP
PECO ENERGY CO
PEOPLES GAS LIGHT
RYLAND ACCEPTANCE CO

Fitch Moody
Duff
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.0
2.0
4.0
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.0
2.0
4.0
1.5
1.5
4.0
3.0
3.0
1.0
1.5
1.5
3.5
1.0
4.0
2.5
3.5
1.5
3.5
1.0
2.0
3.5
2.0
2.0
2.0

S&P
2.5
2.0
2.5
2.5
2.0
3.0
3.0
3.5
2.5
1.5
3.5
4.0

R-Fitch= 1 R-m«>= 2 8 R s* p = 2 5

86.5

7.0

8.5

Hypothesis Two
The ranked data for Hypothesis Two in Table 5 consist o f 22 blocks of size four
units. There are twenty two cases where there was a four-way tie in the rating given
before the four agencies upgraded their ratings. If a particular issuer had two four-way
ties before the agencies upgraded, the most recent four-way tie was the tie that was used
in the sample.
Table 5 shows there is no interaction between the blocks and the treatments.
Also, the observations within each block are order of magnitude ranked. The ranks are
based on a 1.0 to 4.0 scale, adjusted for ties. The rank 1.0 is the agency that upgrades
fastest and the rank 4.0 is the agency that is the slowest to upgrade.
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Table 5: Ranks fo r Hypothesis Two

Allied
Arizona Public
Central
Chrysler Corp
Chrysler Finance
Citicorp
CMS
Georgia Power
IBM
Lockheed
Long Island
Mattel
MDU Resources
Michigan Consol
Nabisco
Occidental
Ohio Power
Panenergy
Panhandle
PHH
PSI
Peoples

Duff
4.0
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
1.0
1.0
3.5
1.0
3.5
4.0
1.0
3.5
1.0
3.5
3.5
3.5
2.0
4.0
3.5
2.0
1.0

Fitch
1.0
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
4.0
3.5
3.5
4.0
3.5
1.0
4.0
3.5
4.0
3.5
3.5
3.5
1.0
1.0
3.5
1.0
2.0

RoufT^O.S RFitch=65.0

Moody
2.0
2.0
2.0
1.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
1.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
1.0
1.0
4.0
2.0
2.0
3.0
4.0

Rmoo=45.0

S&P
3.0

1.0
1.0
2.0
1.0
3.0
3.5

1.0
3.0
2.0
3.0
3.0
1.0
3.0
1.0
2.0
2.0
3.0
3.0
1.0
4.0
3.0

Rs+p=49.5

Hypothesis Three
There are 37 independent blocks (issuers) of size four in Table Six. There is no
interaction between blocks and treatments. The observations within each block are in
rank order.
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The ranks in Table 6 are based on a 1.0 to 4.0 scale adjusted forties. The rank 1.0
is given to the agency that downgrades fastest and the rank 4.0 is given to the agency that
downgrades slowest

Table 6: Ranks for Hypothesis Three
Duff

Fitch

Moody

S&P

Aames Financial

4.0

1.0

2.5

2.5

Appalachian

3.5

3.5

1.0

2.0

Aristar

3.5

3.5

1.0

2.0

Bank America

3.5

3.5

2.0

1.0

Capital One

3.5

3.5

1.0

2.0

Citgo

3.5

3.5

2.0

1.0

Citizen Utilities

1.0

4.0

3.0

2.0

Cleveland Electric

1.0

4.0

2.0

3.0

Consumers Energy

3.5

3.5

1.0

2.0

Donaldson Lufkin

3.5

3.5

1.0

2.0

El Paso Electric

3.5

3.5

1.0

2.0

Enron

3.5

3.5

1.0

2.0

Finova

3.5

3.5

1.0

2.0

Fleet

3.5

3.5

2.0

1.0

Frontier

1.0

4.0

2.0

3.0

Gulf Power

3.5

3.5

1.0

2.0

Heller

3.5

3.5

1.0

2.0

Household Finance

3.5

3.5

2.0

1.0
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Table 6: (continued)
Duff

Fitch

Moody

S&P

Household Internal

3.5

3.5

1.0

2.0

Houston Ind

3.5

3.5

1.0

2.0

ITT

1.0

4.0

3.0

2.0

ITT Industries

3.5

3.5

1.0

2.0

Lehman Holdings

3.5

35

1.0

2.0

Mellon

3.5

3.5

1.0

2.0

Merrill

3.5

3.5

1.0

2.0

Noram

3.5

3.5

2.0

1.0

Northern Indiana

3.5

3.5

1.0

2.0

Northwest Pipeline

3.5

3.5

2.0

1.0

Potomoc

1.0

4.0

3.0

2.0

Republic

4.0

1.0

2.5

2.5

RJR

3.5

3.5

2.0

1.0

Southern Cal

3.5

3.5

2.0

1.0

Southern Ind

3.5

3.5

2.0

1.0

Electronic

3.5

3.5

1.0

2.0

Fifth Third

3.5

3.5

1.0

2.0

Geon

3.5

3.5

1.0

2.0

Peco

3.5

3.5

2.0

1.0

R o u fl^ H S .O

R f,«*= 1 2 7 .0

Rmoo=58.0

Rs*P=67.0

.
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Hypothesis Four
The ranked data for Hypothesis Four in Table 7 consist of 22 blocks of four units.
There is no interaction between blocks and means. The observations within each block
are in rank order.
There are 22 cases where there was a four-way tie in the rating given before the
agencies upgraded their ratings. If a particular issuer had two four-way ties before the
agencies upgraded, the tie in the most recent year was the tie selected to test Hypothesis
Four(shown in Table Seven). Upgrades of greater than one level are now implemented
based on the magnitude of upgrade.
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Table 7: Ranks for Hypothesis Four
Duff
Allied
Arizona Public
Central
Chrysler Corp
Chrysler Finance
Citicorp
CMS
Georgia Power(2)
Georgia Power
IBM
Lockheed
Long Island(3)
Long Island
Long Island
Mattel
MDU
Michigan Consol
Nabisco
Occidental
Ohio Power
Panenergy(3)
Panenergy
Panenergy
Panhandle(3)
Panhandle
Panhandle
PHH
PSI
Peoples

4.0
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
1.0
1.0
3.5
3.5
1.0
3.5
4.0
4.0
4.0
1.0
3.5
1.0
3.5
3.5
3.5
2.0
2.0
2.0
4.0
4.0
4.0
3.5
2.0
1.0
R o u f n ^ .O

Fitch
1.0
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
4.0
3.5
3.5
3.5
4.0
3.5
1.0
1.0
1.0
4.0
3.5
4.0
3.5
3.5
3.5
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
3.5
1.0
2.0
R fitc h = 7 4 . 5

Moody
2.0
2.0
2.0
1.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
1.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
1.0
1.0
4.0
4.0
4.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
3.0
4.0

S&P
3.0
1.0
1.0
2.0
1.0
3.0
3.5
1.0
1.0
3.0
2.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
1.0
3.0
1.0
2.0
2.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
1.0
4.0
3.0

RMoo~63.0 R s*p=68.5

Hypothesis Five
There are 37 independent blocks (issuers) o f size four units in Table Eight There
is no interaction between blocks and treatments. The observations within each block are
in rank order.
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The ranks in Table Eight are based on a 1.0 to 4.0 scale, adjusted forties. In Table
8, the rank 1.0 is given to the agency that downgrades fastest and the rank 4.0 is given to
the agency that downgrades the slowest Downgrades of greater than one level are now
implemented based on the magnitude of downgrade.
Table 8: Ranks for Hypothesis Five

Aames(2)
Aames
Appalachian
Aristar
Bank America
Capital One
Citgo
Citizen Utilities
Cleveland Electric
Consumers Energy
Donaldson Lufkin
El Paso Electric
Enron
Finova
Fleet
Frontier
Gulf Power
Heller
Household Finance
Household Inter(2)
Household Inter
ITT(2)
ITT
ITT Ind
Lehman
Mellon
Merrill
Noram
Northern Indiana
Northwest Pipeline
Potomoc

Duff
4.0
4.0
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
1.0
1.0
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
1.0
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
1.0
1.0
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
1.0

Moody

Fitch
1.0
1.0
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
4.0
4.0
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
4.0
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
4.0
4.0
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
4.0

S&P
2.5
2.5
1.0
1.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
2.0
2.0
1.0
1.0
2.0
1.0
1.0
3.0
3.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
2.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
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2.5
2.5
2.0
2.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
1.0
3.0
2.0
2.0
1.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
1.0
2.0
1.0
2.0
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Table 8: (continued)
Republic
RJR
Southern Cal(2)
Southern Cal
Southern Ind
Electronic
Fifth Third(2)
Fifth Third
Geon
Peco

Moody
Duff
Fitch
S&P
4.0
1.0
2.5
2.5
3.5
3.5
1.0
2.0
3.5
3.5
1.0
2.0
3.5
3.5
2.0
1.0
3.5
1.0
3.5
2.0
3.5
3.5
2.0
1.0
3.5
2.0
3.5
1.0
3.5
3.5
1.0
2.0
3.5
2.0
3.5
1.0
3.5
3.5
2.0
1.0
Rpiicii=
142.0
Rmoo=8 1.5
RDuff=130.0
R s+p=73.5

Hypothesis Six
The aligned ranks test is implemented to test Hypothesis Six as the original 1 to
19 ratings can be maintained only if three treatment (agencies) are utilized (Sprent 1993).
Table 9 displays ratings data for the first five blocks (issuers) of the 203 blocks (issuers)
in March 1989.
Table 9: Mini Sample for Hypothesis Six
S&P

Moo

MCM

Abbott Laboratories

18

18

18

Allied Corp

14

14

13

Allied Signal

14

14

13

ALCOA

14

14

13

American Express

17

17

16

Amoco

19

19

18

Archer-Daniels

17

15

16
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The assumptions for the aligned tanks test hold. The data consist of203 mutually
independent blocks o f size three units. There is no interaction between blocks and
treatments. The additional assumption for the Aligned Ranks test is that the observations
within each block are ranked in order of magnitude. The observations for the data used
to test Hypothesis Six are ranked within each block in order of magnitude.
The hypothesis to test for differences is based on medians:
Ho: Ml = M2 = M3
H I: at least one differs
There is no interaction between the blocks and treatments. The observations
within each block are clearly in rank order.
If the null hypothesis is rejected, a lack of randomness distributed over the
columns (respective bond rating agency rating) in each block should have occurred.
Hypothesis Seven
The Friedman Two-Way Analysis o f Variance by Ranks Test is utilized as the
ranks instead of the original 1 to 19 ratings determine which agency upgraded fastest
The ranks derived from the original ratings are used for this test o f upgrade timeliness.
An illustration of the blocks and treatments (agencies) for Hypothesis Seven is shown
in Table 10.
There is no interaction between blocks and treatments. The observations within
each block are in rank order.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

65
The ranked data for Hypothesis Seven consists o f 81 blocks of size three units.
There are 81 cases in which there is a three-way tie before the agencies upgraded their
ratings. If a particular issuer had two three-way ties before the agencies upgraded, the
most recent three-way tie was the tie included in the sample for Hypothesis Seven.

Table 10: Illustration of Ranks for Hypothesis Seven
S&P

Moody's

MCM

Alabama Power

2.0

3.0

1.0

Baltimore Gas

1.5

1.5

3.0

Boston Edison

2.0

3.0

1.0

California Electric

3.0

1.0

2.0

Con Edison

3.0

1.5

1.5

Consolidated Oil & Gas

1.0

2.0

3.0

Consumers Power

2.5

2.5

1.0

Dallas Power & Light

1.5

1.5

3.0

Dayton Power & Light

2.0

1.0

3.0

Delmarva Power & Light

3.0

2.0

1.0

Detroit Edison

2.0

3.0

1.0

DukePwoer

2.0

1.0

3.0

El Paso Electric

2.5

2.5

1.0

Florida Power

3.0

2.0

1.0

Gas Service Co.

1.0

2.0

3.0

Georgia Power

1.0

3.0

2.0

Houston Light & Power

1.5

1.5

3.0

Idaho Power

2.5

2.5

1.0
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Table 10: (continued)
S&P

Moody's

MCM

Illinois Power

1.0

2.0

3.0

Indiana Gas

1.5

3.0

1.5

Indiana Michigan Power

2.0

3.0

1.0

Indianapolis Power & Light

1.0

3.0

2.0
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CHAPTER 6
RESULTS
This study examines the effect ofsolicitation and independence on corporate bond
ratings. The major potential biases endemic towards agencies who have provided strictly
solicited ratings or a combination of solicited ratings and unsolicited ratings are
addressed.
An independent agency, which has accepted no fee from the issuer, should have
provided true ratings free from biases. No one previously has published analyses of these
issues.
Hypothesis One
The Friedman Two-Way Analysis o f Variance by Ranks test is calculated by first
converting the original observations to ranks. The Friedman test detects departures from
expectation under Ho on the basis of the sums of the ranks by column.
The computational formula for the Friedman Two-way analysis of Variance by
ranks Test is calculated as:

=

[12 /(94)(4)(5)] * [(208)2+(186.5)2+ (287)2 + (258.5)2] - 3(94X5)

67
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X2r =

[12 /1880] * (43264 + 34782.25 + 82369 + 66822.25) - 1410

X2r =

[12/1880] *(227237.5)-1410

X2r =

(0.006382)(227237.5) - 1410

X2r =

1450.43-1410

X2r =

40.43

If X2r <= X2 ( l 'a ; k-lX do not reject Ho
X2r > X2 (l-« ;k -l), reject Ho

For a = 0.10, need x2(0.90,3) = 6.25
X2r = 40.43 > 6.25, reject Ho at a = 0.1
at least one agency gives different ratings than the others.
Multiple Comparison Procedure
| Rj - Rj11>= Z [bK(K+l) / 6]1/2
a = 0.1
K=4
0.1/4 = 0.25 Z = 1.96
(1.96)

[(94X4X5)/6]1/2

=

(1.96) [1880/6]1/2
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=

(1.96X17.7)

=

34.60

Duff_____________Fitch_____________ Moody’s
208.0

186.5

287.0

S&P
258.5

1208.0-I86.5| = 21.5 <34.6
1208.0 - 287.0| = 79.0 > 34.6 * [Duff & Fitch]
1208.0 - 258.5| = 50.5 > 34.6 * [Duff & S&P]
1186.5 - 287.0| = 100.5 > 34.6 * [Fitch & Moody’s]
1186.5 - 258.5| = 72.0 > 34.6 * [Fitch & S&P]
|287.0-258.5| =28.5 <34.6
The six pairs computed show exactly where the differences are located. The
multiple comparison procedure for use with the Friedman test shows significance
differences among the four agencies.
The ratings of Duff and Moody’s, Duff and S&P, Fitch and Moody’s, Fitch and
S&P are dissimilar. Neither Duff and Fitch nor Moody’s and S&P gave different ratings.
Duff had higher ratings than S&P, Duff had higher ratings than Moody’s, Fitch had
higher ratings than S&P, and Fitch had higher ratings thanMoody’s. Duffand Phelps had
higher ratings than both S&P and Moody’s, and Fitch had higher ratings than both S&P
and Moody’s.
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Hypothesis Two

To calculate the test the sums o f the ranks Rj in each column is obtained. The
Friedman test detects departures from expectation under Ho on the basis o f the sums of
the ranks by column.
The computational formula o f the Friedman test statistic is:
X \ = {12/(22X4)(5)}{ (60.5)2 + (65? + (45? +(49.5?>- 3(22X5)
= (12/440X3660 + 4225 + 2025 +2450) - 330
= 0.027 (12360)-330
X2r = 333.72-330

= 0.72

If x2r <= X20 -a >K-l), do not reject Ho2
If X2r > X20 - a , K-l), reject Ho2

For a = 0.1 need x2(0.9,3) = 6.25

X2r=

0.72 < 6.25 do not reject Ho2 at a = 0.1. Cannot reject Ho2 that all four

bond rating agencies upgraded their rating at the same time.
Hypothesis Three
The Friedman test detects departures from expectation under Ho on the basis of
the sums of the ranks by column. The computational formula for the Friedman test
statistic is:
x2, = {12/(37X4X5)} { (118J2+ (127X + (S S f « 6 7 f) - 3(37X5)
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= (12/740X13924 + 16129 + 3364 + 4489) - 555
= 0.0162 (37906)-555
X2r = 614.07 - 555 = 59.07
If x2r <= X2( l-a»K -l), do not reject Ho3
IfX2r > X2( l“a »K -l), reject Ho3

For a = 0.1 need x2(0 .9 3 ) = 6.25
X2r= 59.07 > 6.25, reject Ho3 at a = 0.1, at least one agency downgraded its
ratings at an earlier time.
Multiple Comparison Procedure
| Rj - Rj* | = Z [bK(K+l) / 6 ]1/2

a = 0.1
K=4
0.1/4 = 0.25 Z = 1.96
(1.96)

[(37X4X5)/6],y2
=

=

(1.96) (123.3)1/2

21.76

Duff

Fitch

Moody’s

118.0

127.0

58.0
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|118-127| = 9 <21.76
|118-58| =60 >21.76* [D uff* Moody’s]
|118 - 67| = 51 > 21.76 * [Duff & S&P]
1127 - 58| = 69 > 21.76 * [Fitch & Moody’s]
|127 - 67| = 60 > 21.76 * [Fitch & S&P]
|58-67|

= 9 <21.76

Duffand Moody, Duffand S&P, Fitch and Moody’s, Fitch and S&P downgraded
at different times. Duffand Fitch, Moody’s and S&P downgraded at same time. Moody’s
downgraded earlier than Duff and Fitch. S&P downgraded earlier than Duff and Fitch.
Hypothesis Four
The Friedman test for Hypothesis Four detects departures from expectation under
Ho on the basis of the magnitudes of the sums of the ranks by column.
computational formula for the test statistic is computed as:

X \ = {12/(22)(4X5)} { (84f + (74.5 f + (63)2 +(68.5f } - 3(22X5)
= (12/440)(7056 + 5550 + 3969 +4692) - 330
= 0.027 (21267)-330
X2r = 574 - 330
X2r —244 reject Ho
(1.96) [(22X4X5)/6],/2 = 1.96(8.56)
= 16.78
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Duff

Fitch

Moody’s

S&P

84

74.5

63

68.5

{84 - 74.5|

= 9.5 <16

|84 - 63|

= 21 >16

|84-68.5|

= 15 <16

|74.5-63| = 11.5 <16
|74.5-68.5| = 6
|63 - 68.5|

<16

= 5.5 <16

Moody’s has a larger upgrade magnitude than Duff. None of the other combinations
differed significantly.
Hypothesis Five
The Friedman test detects departures from expectation under Ho on the basis of
the magnitudes ofthesum softhe ranks by column. The computational formula of the
test statistic is computed as:
X \ = {12/(37)(4X5)} { (130)2 + (142)2 + (81.5)2 -K73.5)2}- 3(37)(5)
= (12/740)(16900 + 20164 + 6642 + 5402) - 555
= 0.0162 (49108) - 555
X2r - 795 - 555 = 240
Reject Ho5
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Multiple Comparison Procedure
(1.96)[(37X4X5)/6]I/2

=

21.76

Duff

Fitch__________ Moody’s__________S&P

130

142

|130-142| = 12

813

73.5

<21.76

|130 - 81.5| = 48.5 > 21.76 * [Duff & Moody’s]
|130 - 73.5| = 56.5 > 21.76 * [Duff & S&P]
|142 - 81.5| = 60.5 > 21.76 * [Fitch & Moody’s]
(142 - 73.5| = 68.5 > 21.76 * [Fitch & S&P]
|81.5-73.5| = 8

<21.76

At a = 0.1, Moody’s has a larger downgrade magnitude than both Duff and Fitch. S&P
has a larger downgrade magnitude than both Duff and Fitch. There is no difference at a
= 0.1 between S&P and Moody’s. There is no difference between Fitch and Duff.
Hypothesis Six
The results would have rejected at the .05 level o f significance if the x \ test
statistic computed from the data exceeded the critical value o f 5.991 for k-1 = 2 degrees
of freedom.
The empirical research produced the following results for the Rj's:
R(s&p) = 456.75
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R(moody’s) = 489.23
R(mcm) = 269.19
X2r= 128.7

128.7 > 5.991, hence, a rejection of Ho6 at the .05 level of significance. Clearly,
the ties adjustment will also lead to rejection of Ho6 as adjusting for ties inflates xV
One should note that the F large sample approximation provides a more accurate
test statistic (Iman and Davenport 1980). The F approximation uses k-1 and (b-l)(k-l)
degrees of freedom. The approximation always uses k-1 as its degrees o f freedom
regardless of the number of blocks. This fact could be partially explain the inaccuracy
of the x2r approximation. However, only with small sample sizes did the x2r large
sample approximation prove grossly inaccurate. Increased accuracy in the size of the
critical region resulted from the use of F or J approximations formulated by Iman and
Davenport (1980).
The F statistic ofF = 145.32 with b=203 and k=3 caused a rejection of Ho. When
testing for differences in ratings of the three firms, 1-19 ratings provided a great deal of
information. Hence, the aligned ranks test proved crucial for measuring ratings
differences for the three bond rating agencies (S&P, Moody’s, and MCM).
Clearly the F-test provided the most powerful test, with little or no information
loss. However, the ratings may not be normally distributed, thereby restricting its use.
Outliers also could have affected the F-test.
The aligned ranks test, far superior to the Friedman for this application, made use
of the original data and the differences in original utility.

The aligned ranks test
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involved subtracting from each observation within a block some measure oflocation, (the
block mean or median). The resulting differences, called aligned observations, ranked
from 1 to kb relative to each other, kept their identities with respect to the proper block
and treatment combination.
If all three bond rating firms gave approximately the same ratings, one would
expect each of the blocks to receive about the same sequence o f aligned ranks. If Ho6 is
not rejected, it would have made treatment rank totals approximately equal.
Without ties, the aligned rank test statistic for the RCB has Ri = rank total of the
ith block and Rij = rank total of the jth treatment The study compared test statistic T for
significance with the critical value having k-1 degrees of freedom.

A mini random

sample (Table 11) of the first six firms beginning with the letter nCn illustrates the
utilization of the aligned ranks test to test for differences in the bond agency ratings.

Table 11: Mini Random Sample for Hypothesis Six
Block (bond

S&P

Moody's

MCM

Catepillar Inc.

13

14

13

Centel Corp

12

12

11

Central Power

13

15

12

Champion Inc

11

12

12

Chase Manhattan

14

12

11

Chemical Banking

14

12

11
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The following listing displays the block means:
1
1333

2

3

4

5

6

11.67

12.67

11.67

12.33

1233

The aligned observations are presented in Table 12.

For the sample of 203

blocks, T = 21.64 and with k-1 = 2 degrees of freedom. Hence, we rejected Ho6 and
concluded that at least one of the three bond rating agencies gave different ratings.

Table 12: Aligned Observations for Hypothesis Six
S&P

Moody’s

MCM

-.33

.67

-.33

.33

.33

-.67

.33

2.33

-2.67

-.67

.33

.33

1.67

-.33

-1.33

1.67

-.33

-1.33

Multiple Comparison Procedure
Because of Ho6's rejection, one needs to know which of the bond rating agencies
differed from the others. Choosing an experimentwise error rate of <*=.10, withk=3;Z
represented the value from the normal distribution table. Hence, Z = 2.05. The formula
is used for the large number of blocks (because b =203) declared R(Moody’s), R(S&P)
and R(MCM) significantly different is
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(|Rj-iyi>z).
The right-hand side o f the identity is 41.3, with rank totals of:
Moody’s

S&P

MCM

456.75

489.23

269.99

1456.75 - 489.23| = 32.48 < 41.3
{489.23 - 269.99| = 219.24 > 41.3 * [S&P & MCM]
1456.75 - 269.99| = 186.76 > 413 * [Moody’s & MCM]
Thus, we concluded that MCM and Moody's gave different ratings and MCM and
S&P gave different ratings but Moody's and S&P did not. MCM gave lower ratings
than either S&P or Moody’s.
Hypothesis Seven
The Friedman Two-way Analysis of Variance is used to test Hypothesis Seven.
Had the finding rejected Ho7, a multiple-comparison procedure would be used with the
Friedman test to determine exactly which ofthe three bond rating agencies first upgraded
their ratings.
The data originally came from 112 electric utilities listed in the MCM Ratings
Perspectives (1989\

There were 81 three-way ties.

The rating changes follow ties.

The agency that first departed the three way tie, is given the first rank, the agency that
moved next is given the second rank and the agency that moved last is given the third
rank. If there is more than one three way tie for a particular issuer, the most recent is
used.
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A limitation o f the timeliness test o f Hypothesis Seven concerned external
validity. Since the entire sample consisted o f electric utilities, the test results might
have applied only to electric utilities.
The next step is to compare the chi-square test statistic = 60.9 with the tabulated
value of chi-square with 2 degrees of freedom = 5.991. Clearly Ho7 is rejected at the a
= 05 level of significance.
Because of Ho7’s rejection, one needed to determine which of the bond rating
agencies differed from the others in terms of rating change timeliness. Choosing an q=
.10, with k=3, Z = 2.05, yielded rank totals of:

________ Moody’s__________
401.71

S&P

MCM

413.78

312.72

1401.71 -413.78| = 12.07 <26.1
1413.78 - 312.72| = 101.06 > 26.1 * [S&P & MCM]
1401.71 - 312.72| = 88.99 > 26.1 * [Moody’s & MCM]

Thus, MCM upgraded its ratings earlier than either Moody's or S&P; Moody's
and S&P did not differ in terms of rating upgrades.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS
The purpose ofthis study is to examine the effect of solicitation and independence
on corporate bond ratings. Agencies which are totally or partially solicited receive a fee
from issuers and therefore have the potential to assign biased ratings.
The independent agency, which accepts no fee from the issuer has no incentive
to inflate ratings. The independent agency MCM is utilized to determine if its ratings
differ from Moody’s or S&P and to determine if its upgrades are timely.
The Difference in Ratings Conclusion
The first research question indicates that an agency which performs only solicited
ratings may provide significantly higher ratings. To be sure, the higher Duff and Phelps
and Fitch IBCA ratings may in part, be attributed to sample selection bias. In addition,
it is possible that the higher ratings are the more accurate or truer ratings. However, the
fact that the ratings for Duff and Phelps are higher keeps open the hypothesis that
solicited agency gives higher ratings because of the compensation arrangement. The
ratings of both Duff and Phelps and Fitch IBCA have traditionally been sought when
there is an expectation of obtaining a higher rating than that assigned by Moody’s or
S&P. In recent years, issuers have often sought the ratings ofDuffand Phelps and Fitch
80
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IBCA without regard to whether there is an expectation of improving the ratings o f
Moody’s and/or S&P.
The first research question is also important because the ratings provided by
Moody’s and S&P are not significantly different even though there has been an ongoing
Justice Department investigation of Moody’s. The investigation is focusing on the
allegation that Moody’s may have pressured issuers to use its ratings in an attempt to
expand its market share(Harington 1997). Hence, the results do not indicate that the
investigation has been a factor in causing Moody’s ratings to differ from Standard and
Poor’s. The timeliness hypotheses would be more appropriate in terms of determining
whether Fitch IBCA is punishing issuers for not subscribing to its rating service.
The Timeliness Conclusions
The second hypothesis, pertaining to timeliness of upgrades, is not rejected. This
implies that the totally solicited firm (Duffand Phelps) is reluctant to take a conspicuous
role in upgrades. A similar conclusion can be reached for Fitch IBCA.
The results of the third research question indicates that the fully or predominantly
solicited agency have incentives which make it reluctant to provide the true rating. The
results imply that Duff and Phelps and Fitch IBCA are hesitant to upset their clients. The
close relations with management endemic to solicitation is likely causing these two
agencies not to take any sort of assertiveness in terms of downgrading the issuers.
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The Magnitude Conclusions
The results ofthe fourth research question which are another indicator of the effect
of solicitation, imply that Moody’s is willing to be a leader in upgrading. Duffand Phelps
would have less incentive in providing an upgrade or downgrade with higher magnitude.
This result might be explained by the fact that only Duffand Phelps will honor an issuer’s
request to be not rated. In addition, Duff and Phelps would have incentive to shift its
ratings by only one level.
The results o f the fifth hypothesis imply that the fully or highly solicited agencies
are more concerned about their relationship with issuers. This conclusion is relevant
because Moody’s and S&P have a larger downgrade magnitude than both Duff and
Phelps, and Fitch IBCA. Furthermore, the internal validity increases because there is
no difference in downgrade magnitude between Moody’s and S&P, and between Fitch
IBCA and Duff and Phelps.
The Independence Conclusions
The results show that MCM gives significantly lower ratings than Moody's and
S&P. The results also show that MCM changed its ratings first more often than either
S&P or Moody’s.

From the findings of the sixth and seventh research questions, one

can conclude that there is

evidence that independence affects bond ratings and

timeliness.
One can conclude that the independent agency can more easily assert that a
particular issuer is having a deleterious effect on bondholders. The customers of the
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independent agency are provided with advanced word on bond upgrades.

The

conclusions for Hypotheses One thru Seven are depicted in Table 13.

Table 13: Summary of Hypotheses Testing Results
Hypothesis
Hvoothesis One
Difference in
Ratings

Hvoothesis Two
Timeliness for
Upgradings

Hypothesis Three
Timeliness for
Downgradings

Description of
Research

Testing Outcome

Implications

The ratings of the
the four full-scale
bond rating agencies
did not differ.

Reject.
DCR and Fitch had
higher ratings than
both Moody’s and
S&P.

Fees may
influence the
agencies’
ratings.
Higher
ratings also
may be the
truer ratings
or due to
sample
selection
bias.

All four full-scale
bond rating agencies
upgraded their
ratings at the same
time.

Do not reject.
All four agencies
upgraded at the same
time.

Solicited firm
maybe
reluctant to
take
conspicuous
role in terms
of
upgradings.

All four full-scale
bond rating agencies
downgraded their
ratings at the same
time.

Reject
Moody’s and S&P
both downgraded
earlier than DCR and
Fitch.

The solicited
agencies may
be hesitant to
upset the
issuers.
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Table 13: (continued)
Hypothesis
Hypothesis Four
Magnitude for
Upgradings.

Hypothesis Five
Magnitude for
Downgradings

Hvoothesis Six
Independence for
Difference in
Ratings

Hypothesis Seven
Independence for
Upgrades

Description of
Research

Testing Outcome

Implications

All four full-scale
bond rating agencies
provided an
equivalent upgrade
magnitude.

Reject
Moody’s has a larger
upgrade magnitude
than DCR. None of
the other
combinations
differed significantly.

Result could
be due to the
fact that DCR
in
comparison
to Moody’s
has incentive
to shift its
ratings by
one level as
opposed to
more than
more level.

The downgrade
magnitudes o f the
four full-scale rating
agencies did not
significantly differ.

Reject
Moody’s and S&P
have a larger
downgrade than both
DCR and Fitch.

The solicited
agencies may
be more
concerned
about
alienating the
issuers.

The bond ratings of
S&P, Moody's, and
MCM did not differ.

Reject
MCM gave lower
ratings than either
S&P or Moody’s.

Independence
affects the
ratings of a
rating
agency.

S&P, Moody’s, and
MCM upgraded their
ratings at the same
time.

Reject
MCM upgraded its
ratings earlier than
either Moody’s or
S&P.

Independence
affects the
timeliness of
a rating
agency.
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T.imitations

The use of electric utilities to test timeliness in Hypothesis Seven is a limitation
with respect to external validity. It is difficult to determine whether the results of this test
can be applied to other industries.

Recnmmendations

Future research examine whether the market reacts more to MCM's, Moody’s,
or S&P’s changes, extending the analysis of Weinstein (1977) and Wakeman (1981).
Those two studies do not find that bond rating changes convey timely information.
Wakeman asserts that the rating agencies provide a valuable liquidity-enhancing
service and that bond ratings do not appear to influence investors' pricing of bonds, at
least after the initial issue. A limitation of Wakeman's study is that it is based solely on
S&P and Moody's.

Using an event study methodology, one can determine whether

MCM's bond ratings influence investor's bond pricing. The event study methodology can
also incorporate bond yields. As a confounding issue, MCM did not always change
ratings before the others.
With MCM fully independent of the issuers, S&P and Moody's should not
decrease ratings as quickly. When S&P and Moody’s downgrade a bond more quickly,
that downgrade should contain more information.
Future studies of this issue should separate upgrades and downgrades. Hite and
Warga (1997) asserted that downgraded firms revealed a significant announcement effect
in both the announcement month and preannouncement period. The magnitude of
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downgrading effects, according to Hite and Warga (1997), increase dramatically as the
sample changes from investment-grade to non-investment grade firms.
MCM specialized in high yield bonds. In order to determine whether MCM's
ratings for these bonds meant more to the market than investment grade bonds, the study
should analyze investment and speculative grades separately.
Intra-industry effects ofbond rating adjustments studied by Akhigbe, Madura and
Whyte (1997) could be applied to the MCM case. It would be interesting to determine
if intra-industry rivals experience significantly negative valuation effects at the time of
the MCM bond rating downgrade announcements. The MCM context, recognizing the
only independent agency, may resolve the long-standing debate as to whether rating
changes bring any new information to the market orjust summarize existing information.
The results of the present study provide impetus towards research on the independent
agency Egan-Jones. Due to the results o f this study, Moody’s and S&P should face more
competition from Egan-Jones and any new independent agencies. Egan-Jones should be
able to become more financially viable by charging more for its ratings and publications.
Investors should lose confidence in the timeliness of S&P and Moody’s ratings. More
appeals of the ratings provided by Moody’s and S&P is likely to occur.
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